30 de octubre 2009
COMUNICADO DE PRENSA
La Unión Europea está siguiendo el juicio de la activista política Javakheti Vahagn Chakhalyan.
El Comisionado de la Unión Europea de Relaciones Exteriores, Benita Ferrero-Waldner responde a los miembros del Parlamento Europeo Sylvie Guillaume
Yerevan,28 de octubre 2009
El 15 de septiembre el diputado del Parlamento Europeo, Sylvie Guillaume escribió al Comisario Europeo de Relaciones Exteriores, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, para pedirle que llamar la atención de las estructuras pertinentes de la UE para el caso de la activista política Javakheti Vahagn Chakhalyan
l 7 de octubre Mme. Ferrero-Waldner, respondió a esta carta, indicando que la Unión Europea está siguiendo todos los acontecimientos en el juicio de Chakhalyan a través de su Delegación en Georgia.
A continuación se muestra la traducción completa de la carta de respuesta al Inglés, hecha por "Yerkir" de la Unión.
Mme Sylvie GuillaumeBruselas, 7 de octubre 2009
Señora,Gracias por su carta de fecha 15 de septiembre de 2009, sobre la situación de las minorías nacionales en Georgia. Les aseguro que se le dio la máxima atención.
Como usted sabe, la UE y Georgia, como parte de la política de vecindad, han acordado una serie de objetivos ambiciosos. Estos objetivos se traducen en compromisos específicos contraídos por Georgia en el Plan de Acción, incluido el funcionamiento de las instituciones democráticas, el Estado de Derecho y el respeto de los derechos humanos.
El documento también contiene disposiciones sobre las minorías. Los compromisos asumidos por Georgia en este campo incluyen los derechos de las minorías étnicas y su seguridad, el respeto de los derechos de propiedad y la firma y ratificación de la Carta Europea de Lenguas Regionales o Minoritarias. Todas estas cuestiones se debatirán en el diálogo político regular con Georgia y están sujetas a revisión periódica, en el informe que publicamos cada año para cada país participante en la Unión Política Europea de Vecindad.
Además, el reciente fortalecimiento de la Asociación Oriental, tanto en sus dimensiones multilaterales y bilaterales, le dará mayor importancia al diálogo político con Georgia. Aprovechamos cada oportunidad para recordar a las autoridades de Georgia acerca de la estrecha relación entre esta y la necesidad de seguir avanzando en el pluralismo político, la democracia y el respeto de las minorías. Por otra parte, el nivel de aspiración en las relaciones con la Unión Europea dependerá de la inclusión de estos valores en las políticas y acciones emprendidas por Georgia.
Por favor, tenga también en cuenta que más asistencia financiera sustancial concedida a Georgia para el periodo 2008-2010 fue acompañado de renovados compromisos, llevada a cabo por el Gobierno georgiano en la democracia, el Estado de Derecho y la independencia del poder judicial. Nos tomamos muy en serio estas cuestiones.
Sobre el Sistema de Justicia, debo decirles que me conceden la máxima importancia para el proyecto de apoyo a las reformas en el campo, que nos ayuden financieramente. Su objetivo es hacer la justicia más transparente, incluida la aplicación de las reformas del sistema de justicia penal del Estado y el fortalecimiento de la Oficina del Defensor Público.
En cuanto al juicio en curso del Sr. Chakhalyan que usted ha mencionado, me complace informarle de que seguimos todos los desarrollos a través del cuidadoso trabajo de nuestra delegación en Tbilisi. Se sigue este proceso con rapidez, en estrecha colaboración con la Presidencia y los Estados miembros sobre el terreno.
Le ruego acepte el testimonio de mi mas alta consideracion
Benita ferrero-Waldner
"Yerkir" Union de las Organizaciones no Gubernamentales para la repatriación y el asentamiento. www.yerkir.org
Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-
viernes, 30 de octubre de 2009
jueves, 29 de octubre de 2009
Nombres de lugares en el republicano turquia - traductor automatico
29 de octubre 2009
Ruben Malkonyan
TURKISHIZING DE LOS NOMBRES DEL LUGAR EN EL REPUBLICANO TURQUÍA
Si bien el análisis de algunas manifestaciones de la política interna de la República de Turquía, podemos mencionar que son en su mayoría de carácter Turkishizing. Hubo varios procesos en curso en el recién formado Turquía, que estaban dirigidos a formar el Estado turco homogéneo. Este proceso, inevitablemente, debe tocar en los nombres de lugar, porque en la Turquía otomana hubo muchos lugares mencionados en las lenguas de las naciones indígenas, que son directamente demostrar su presencia. Los nombres de lugar, al mismo tiempo, mostrar el pasado histórico, la historia de la gente que vivía allí, algunos detalles de su mentalidad. Esa es la razón por la función muy importante fue adjudicada a la Turkishizing de los nombres de lugar en la República de Turquía.
El proceso de Turkishizing de los nombres de lugar, al igual que la política de Tukishizing en general, no era un fenómeno nuevo y se había iniciado mucho tiempo antes. Pero esta política adquirió más relieve y sistematizado de caracteres en la mitad del siglo 19 y se profundizan aún más durante el gobierno de los Jóvenes Turcos.
En la Turquía kemalista las propuestas de cambiar los nombres de lugar se hicieron tan tarde como a principios de 1920. En 1922, algunos nombres de lugares de Armenia, que ya habían sido distorsionadas, se han renombrado. En particular, Moks histórico, que se transformó en Mokyus, que hoy se llama Bahcesaray. En 1928, los nombres de lugares griego en la Sede del mar Egeo y los nombres de lugares de Armenia en las regiones meridionales y orientales, se cambió el nombre y Turkishized. Pero el proceso de escala más grande del cambio de nombre se inició en 1940 cuando el Ministerio del Interior de Turquía, los problemas de la Circular n ° 8589, donde la necesidad de cambiar "los nombres de los centros de población y los nombres de lugar, que descienden de las lenguas extranjeras y las raíces y que provocan malentendidos durante su utilización "con los nombres de Turquía se ha mencionado con claridad. Después de que la administración de las provincias preparado y enviado al Ministerio las listas de los "extranjeros" los nombres de lugares. El período durante el cual se llevó a cabo este proceso, también es notable - 1940, cuando a gran escala Turkishizing procesos fueron sucediendo en Turquía (por ejemplo, en economía), cuando hubo diferentes manifestaciones de la discriminación de la población no musulmana.
Las obras concretas sobre Turkishizing de los topónimos se inició en 1957 cuando se creó la Comisión "especializados para el cambio de nombre de los topónimos". Se fueron los representantes del Estado Mayor General, los Ministerios de Interior, Defensa, y Educación, la Facultad de Lingüística y geo-históricos y profesores "de Turquía Asociación de Lingüística". Hay otro matiz notable aquí, es decir, aunque las autoridades de Turquía ha cambiado, no tenía ninguna influencia en la política de Turkishizing. La comisión mencionada había trabajado hasta 1978 y durante ese período sobre los nombres de 75 mil lugar se estudiaron y 28 mil fueron renombrados. El investigador turco, profesor asociado de la Universidad de Eprat Harun Tunchel afirma que se han renombrado 12 mil aldeas, que constituyen aproximadamente el 35% de todos los pueblos de Turquía,. Tunchel también ha preparado la lista de los pueblos de nombre y de su distribución cuantitativa provincia, que se presenta abajo:
Nombre de la Provincia
Número de los pueblos
Adana
169
Izmir
68
Adiyaman
224
Kars
398
Afion
88
Kastamonu
295
Aghri
374
Kesaria
86
Amasia
99
Kiriklareli
35
Ankara
193
Kirshehir
39
Antalia
168
Kocaeli
26
Ardvin
101
Konia
236
Aydin
69
Kyutahya
93
Balikesir
110
Malatia
217
Bilecik
32
Manisa
83
Bingol(Tchpakhdjur)
247
Marash
105
Bitlis
236
Mardin
647
Bolu
182
Mugla
70
Burdur
49
Mush
297
Bursa
136
Nevshehir
24
Chanakkale
53
Nigde
48
Chankiri
76
Ordu
134
Chorum
103
Rize
105
Denizli
53
Sakaria
117
Diarbekir
555
Samsun
185
Edirne
20
Siirt (Sghert)
392
Elyagiz(Kharberd)
383
Sinop
59
Erzincan(Erznka)
366
Sebastia
406
Erzurum
653
Tekirdagh
19
Eskishehir
70
Tokat(Evdokia)
245
Gaziantep
279
Trabzon
390
Giresun
167
Tunceli(Dersim)
273
Gumushhane
343
Urfa
389
Hakkari
128
Ushak
47
Hatay
117
Van
415
Esparta
46
Yozghat
90
ICHEL
112
Zonguldak
156
Estambul
21
Total
12211
Resulta claro de esta lista que la mayoría de los nombres de los lugares fueron renombrados en el este, sudeste y zonas del Mar Negro, es decir, principalmente en la Armenia histórica, así como en los territorios griegos. Por estimación Tonchel, la Comisión ha prestado especial atención a los nombres de lugar que las partes constituyentes fueron las palabras tales como morrón rojo,, la iglesia, que muestren claramente su no-turco o no origen musulmán y el rojo la palabra también tenía algo de sombra comunista. Por cierto, el lugar de nacimiento del Primer Ministro turco Erbogan es Guneysu distrito de la provincia de Rize, que hasta ahora se llama entre las personas, obviamente no-turco nombre Potomia.
En la actualidad, el proceso de cambio de nombre de nombres de lugares se trata en Turquía y no de manera activa y los representantes de los principales dirigentes del país que participan en los debates, intentando, por supuesto, para introducir en sus estimaciones que el proceso político y los intereses. Así, muy recientemente, el presidente de Turquía Gul durante su visita a la parte oriental del país, declaró en una de las reuniones que el nombre real de la zona que hoy se llama Guroymak es Norashen. El primer ministro Erdogan, mantuvo el ritmo con el que él decía que era una palabra Manazkert armenio. Todos estos se convirtieron en un problema de política interior y permitieron que la oposición la culpa las autoridades. El partido Movimiento Nacionalista es, como siempre, más activo en esta cuestión. El argumento distantes estalló entre su líder Devlet Bahcheli y el primer ministro Erdogan. En particular, Devlet Bahcheli, culpando a las autoridades, ironizó, diciendo que tal vez puede cambiar el nombre de Estambul y lo llaman Constantinopla.
Cabe mencionar que Estambul, donde se hizo hincapié en el cambio de nombre de las calles con nombres extranjeros, tampoco evitar ese proceso. El Turkishizing de los nombres de las calles de Estambul comenzó en 1927 y su principal objetivo fue el barrio armenio y griego. Hay que decir que algunas tendencias en el cambio de nombre de las calles y los cuartos son evidentes, especialmente en los distritos donde la población armenia y griega domina, nombres de lugares nacionalistas o los nombres de lugares que contienen la llamada "amenaza simbólica" prevalecerá. Aquí nos gustaría traer ejemplo más vívido. Un armenio de Estambul, nos dijo: "Yo vivo en Kurtulush Mi casa está en Ergenekon trimestre, en Turkbey Street, y con el fin de la votación me voy a la escuela después de Taleat Pachá ". Según las investigaciones llevadas a cabo hoy, antes de 1954 los nombres de más de 100 calles y barrios se habían Turkishized en Estambul.
Cabe mencionar que a pesar de los esfuerzos realizados por el Estado turco, algunos nombres de lugares de Armenia se siguen utilizando hasta hoy, aunque en forma distorsionada. Por ejemplo, el pueblo de Tsronq en Mush (rebautizado Krkoy) es llamado por los lugareños Sronq, Hatsekats se llama Hasik, y hay muchos ejemplos de este tipo. Esto demuestra que la gente común no han adquirido nuevos topónimos, y al mismo tiempo, hay los elementos de la memoria histórica en el uso continuo de los topónimos de Armenia.
Otros temas de autor
SOBRE LA MANIFESTACIÓN DE ARMENIA DESCENSO EN TURQUÍA [27.04.2009]
DE ORIENTACIÓN DE ARMENIA Ergenekon [31.03.2009]
Problema del origen étnico en la agenda política EN TURQUÍA [05.03.2009]
SOBRE percepción mutua de armenios en Turquía [09.02.2009]
SOBRE MANIFESTAIONS de identidad en Turquía [22.01.2009]
TURCO "Estado Nación" condiciones previas [04.12.2008]
Especulaciones sobre el PROBLEMA de los armenios de CRYPTO [01.07.2008
Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-
Ruben Malkonyan
TURKISHIZING DE LOS NOMBRES DEL LUGAR EN EL REPUBLICANO TURQUÍA
Si bien el análisis de algunas manifestaciones de la política interna de la República de Turquía, podemos mencionar que son en su mayoría de carácter Turkishizing. Hubo varios procesos en curso en el recién formado Turquía, que estaban dirigidos a formar el Estado turco homogéneo. Este proceso, inevitablemente, debe tocar en los nombres de lugar, porque en la Turquía otomana hubo muchos lugares mencionados en las lenguas de las naciones indígenas, que son directamente demostrar su presencia. Los nombres de lugar, al mismo tiempo, mostrar el pasado histórico, la historia de la gente que vivía allí, algunos detalles de su mentalidad. Esa es la razón por la función muy importante fue adjudicada a la Turkishizing de los nombres de lugar en la República de Turquía.
El proceso de Turkishizing de los nombres de lugar, al igual que la política de Tukishizing en general, no era un fenómeno nuevo y se había iniciado mucho tiempo antes. Pero esta política adquirió más relieve y sistematizado de caracteres en la mitad del siglo 19 y se profundizan aún más durante el gobierno de los Jóvenes Turcos.
En la Turquía kemalista las propuestas de cambiar los nombres de lugar se hicieron tan tarde como a principios de 1920. En 1922, algunos nombres de lugares de Armenia, que ya habían sido distorsionadas, se han renombrado. En particular, Moks histórico, que se transformó en Mokyus, que hoy se llama Bahcesaray. En 1928, los nombres de lugares griego en la Sede del mar Egeo y los nombres de lugares de Armenia en las regiones meridionales y orientales, se cambió el nombre y Turkishized. Pero el proceso de escala más grande del cambio de nombre se inició en 1940 cuando el Ministerio del Interior de Turquía, los problemas de la Circular n ° 8589, donde la necesidad de cambiar "los nombres de los centros de población y los nombres de lugar, que descienden de las lenguas extranjeras y las raíces y que provocan malentendidos durante su utilización "con los nombres de Turquía se ha mencionado con claridad. Después de que la administración de las provincias preparado y enviado al Ministerio las listas de los "extranjeros" los nombres de lugares. El período durante el cual se llevó a cabo este proceso, también es notable - 1940, cuando a gran escala Turkishizing procesos fueron sucediendo en Turquía (por ejemplo, en economía), cuando hubo diferentes manifestaciones de la discriminación de la población no musulmana.
Las obras concretas sobre Turkishizing de los topónimos se inició en 1957 cuando se creó la Comisión "especializados para el cambio de nombre de los topónimos". Se fueron los representantes del Estado Mayor General, los Ministerios de Interior, Defensa, y Educación, la Facultad de Lingüística y geo-históricos y profesores "de Turquía Asociación de Lingüística". Hay otro matiz notable aquí, es decir, aunque las autoridades de Turquía ha cambiado, no tenía ninguna influencia en la política de Turkishizing. La comisión mencionada había trabajado hasta 1978 y durante ese período sobre los nombres de 75 mil lugar se estudiaron y 28 mil fueron renombrados. El investigador turco, profesor asociado de la Universidad de Eprat Harun Tunchel afirma que se han renombrado 12 mil aldeas, que constituyen aproximadamente el 35% de todos los pueblos de Turquía,. Tunchel también ha preparado la lista de los pueblos de nombre y de su distribución cuantitativa provincia, que se presenta abajo:
Nombre de la Provincia
Número de los pueblos
Adana
169
Izmir
68
Adiyaman
224
Kars
398
Afion
88
Kastamonu
295
Aghri
374
Kesaria
86
Amasia
99
Kiriklareli
35
Ankara
193
Kirshehir
39
Antalia
168
Kocaeli
26
Ardvin
101
Konia
236
Aydin
69
Kyutahya
93
Balikesir
110
Malatia
217
Bilecik
32
Manisa
83
Bingol(Tchpakhdjur)
247
Marash
105
Bitlis
236
Mardin
647
Bolu
182
Mugla
70
Burdur
49
Mush
297
Bursa
136
Nevshehir
24
Chanakkale
53
Nigde
48
Chankiri
76
Ordu
134
Chorum
103
Rize
105
Denizli
53
Sakaria
117
Diarbekir
555
Samsun
185
Edirne
20
Siirt (Sghert)
392
Elyagiz(Kharberd)
383
Sinop
59
Erzincan(Erznka)
366
Sebastia
406
Erzurum
653
Tekirdagh
19
Eskishehir
70
Tokat(Evdokia)
245
Gaziantep
279
Trabzon
390
Giresun
167
Tunceli(Dersim)
273
Gumushhane
343
Urfa
389
Hakkari
128
Ushak
47
Hatay
117
Van
415
Esparta
46
Yozghat
90
ICHEL
112
Zonguldak
156
Estambul
21
Total
12211
Resulta claro de esta lista que la mayoría de los nombres de los lugares fueron renombrados en el este, sudeste y zonas del Mar Negro, es decir, principalmente en la Armenia histórica, así como en los territorios griegos. Por estimación Tonchel, la Comisión ha prestado especial atención a los nombres de lugar que las partes constituyentes fueron las palabras tales como morrón rojo,, la iglesia, que muestren claramente su no-turco o no origen musulmán y el rojo la palabra también tenía algo de sombra comunista. Por cierto, el lugar de nacimiento del Primer Ministro turco Erbogan es Guneysu distrito de la provincia de Rize, que hasta ahora se llama entre las personas, obviamente no-turco nombre Potomia.
En la actualidad, el proceso de cambio de nombre de nombres de lugares se trata en Turquía y no de manera activa y los representantes de los principales dirigentes del país que participan en los debates, intentando, por supuesto, para introducir en sus estimaciones que el proceso político y los intereses. Así, muy recientemente, el presidente de Turquía Gul durante su visita a la parte oriental del país, declaró en una de las reuniones que el nombre real de la zona que hoy se llama Guroymak es Norashen. El primer ministro Erdogan, mantuvo el ritmo con el que él decía que era una palabra Manazkert armenio. Todos estos se convirtieron en un problema de política interior y permitieron que la oposición la culpa las autoridades. El partido Movimiento Nacionalista es, como siempre, más activo en esta cuestión. El argumento distantes estalló entre su líder Devlet Bahcheli y el primer ministro Erdogan. En particular, Devlet Bahcheli, culpando a las autoridades, ironizó, diciendo que tal vez puede cambiar el nombre de Estambul y lo llaman Constantinopla.
Cabe mencionar que Estambul, donde se hizo hincapié en el cambio de nombre de las calles con nombres extranjeros, tampoco evitar ese proceso. El Turkishizing de los nombres de las calles de Estambul comenzó en 1927 y su principal objetivo fue el barrio armenio y griego. Hay que decir que algunas tendencias en el cambio de nombre de las calles y los cuartos son evidentes, especialmente en los distritos donde la población armenia y griega domina, nombres de lugares nacionalistas o los nombres de lugares que contienen la llamada "amenaza simbólica" prevalecerá. Aquí nos gustaría traer ejemplo más vívido. Un armenio de Estambul, nos dijo: "Yo vivo en Kurtulush Mi casa está en Ergenekon trimestre, en Turkbey Street, y con el fin de la votación me voy a la escuela después de Taleat Pachá ". Según las investigaciones llevadas a cabo hoy, antes de 1954 los nombres de más de 100 calles y barrios se habían Turkishized en Estambul.
Cabe mencionar que a pesar de los esfuerzos realizados por el Estado turco, algunos nombres de lugares de Armenia se siguen utilizando hasta hoy, aunque en forma distorsionada. Por ejemplo, el pueblo de Tsronq en Mush (rebautizado Krkoy) es llamado por los lugareños Sronq, Hatsekats se llama Hasik, y hay muchos ejemplos de este tipo. Esto demuestra que la gente común no han adquirido nuevos topónimos, y al mismo tiempo, hay los elementos de la memoria histórica en el uso continuo de los topónimos de Armenia.
Otros temas de autor
SOBRE LA MANIFESTACIÓN DE ARMENIA DESCENSO EN TURQUÍA [27.04.2009]
DE ORIENTACIÓN DE ARMENIA Ergenekon [31.03.2009]
Problema del origen étnico en la agenda política EN TURQUÍA [05.03.2009]
SOBRE percepción mutua de armenios en Turquía [09.02.2009]
SOBRE MANIFESTAIONS de identidad en Turquía [22.01.2009]
TURCO "Estado Nación" condiciones previas [04.12.2008]
Especulaciones sobre el PROBLEMA de los armenios de CRYPTO [01.07.2008
Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-
domingo, 25 de octubre de 2009
VAHAGN CHAKHALYAN
Déclaration de Vahagn Chakhalyan, politique du líder Djavakhk, refus hijo annonçant de participer aux audiencias de procès hijo en appel
De:
Unión YERKIR-Europa (contact@yerkir.eu)
Enviado por:
Domingo, 25 de octubre de 2009 07:37:27 p.m.
Para: orgwelcome@hotmail.com - Miguel Angel Nalpatian
contact@yerkir.eu
Versión en inglés, ruso y armenio adjunta
Le 16 octobre 2009, le leader de l'Alliance Démocratique Djavakhk Uni, Vahagn Chakhalyan, actuellement détenu à la prison de haute sécurité n ° 6 de la Ciudad de Roustavi (Géorgie), un avocat à la transmisión hijo une déclaration refus hijo annonçant de participer procès à son.
Déclaration de Vahagn refus hijo Chakhalyan sur de participer aux audiencias de procès hijo en appel.
Le 22 juillet 2009, procès lun s'ouvrait, ainsi que celui de mon père, Rubén et de mon frère cadete Armen, devant la Cour d'appel de Tiflis.
A la fecha d'aujourd'hui, les deux audiencias de la Cour d'appel démontrent que les procédures continuent avec les mêmes violaciónes celles que commises procès lun Durant en première instance:
- Les procédures judiciaires ont eu lieu sans avocat français mon, Patrick Arapian. Les autorités ayant gorgiennes denegar, illégalement, de lui donner une homologación de plaider es Georgie;
- Le juge de la Cour d'appel una rejeté pratiquement toutes les Requêtes de mes abogados Raisons pour des inacceptables;
- La traduction, en Arménien, el público des inadaptée est totalement et incomprensible.
Par conséquent, je n'ai pas la possibilité de suivre correctement le cours du procès, ainsi que d'y participer. Le déroulement de ce procès va à l'encontre des droits de la défense prévue par les lois gorgiennes et internationales.
Dans ces circonstances, la participación ma à cette procédure judiciaire reviendrait à légitimer, contre ma volonté, honteuse farsa cette qui se déroule dans ce tribunal. Rechazar donc je de participer, de mon plein gré, à ce procès.
Vahagn Chakhalyan
16 octobre 2009
Si vous désirez de plus amples renseignements, contactez l'avocat de Vahagn Chakhalyan, Stepan Voskanyan, au (+374) 91 38 37 30.
Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-
De:
Unión YERKIR-Europa (contact@yerkir.eu)
Enviado por:
Domingo, 25 de octubre de 2009 07:37:27 p.m.
Para: orgwelcome@hotmail.com - Miguel Angel Nalpatian
contact@yerkir.eu
Versión en inglés, ruso y armenio adjunta
Le 16 octobre 2009, le leader de l'Alliance Démocratique Djavakhk Uni, Vahagn Chakhalyan, actuellement détenu à la prison de haute sécurité n ° 6 de la Ciudad de Roustavi (Géorgie), un avocat à la transmisión hijo une déclaration refus hijo annonçant de participer procès à son.
Déclaration de Vahagn refus hijo Chakhalyan sur de participer aux audiencias de procès hijo en appel.
Le 22 juillet 2009, procès lun s'ouvrait, ainsi que celui de mon père, Rubén et de mon frère cadete Armen, devant la Cour d'appel de Tiflis.
A la fecha d'aujourd'hui, les deux audiencias de la Cour d'appel démontrent que les procédures continuent avec les mêmes violaciónes celles que commises procès lun Durant en première instance:
- Les procédures judiciaires ont eu lieu sans avocat français mon, Patrick Arapian. Les autorités ayant gorgiennes denegar, illégalement, de lui donner une homologación de plaider es Georgie;
- Le juge de la Cour d'appel una rejeté pratiquement toutes les Requêtes de mes abogados Raisons pour des inacceptables;
- La traduction, en Arménien, el público des inadaptée est totalement et incomprensible.
Par conséquent, je n'ai pas la possibilité de suivre correctement le cours du procès, ainsi que d'y participer. Le déroulement de ce procès va à l'encontre des droits de la défense prévue par les lois gorgiennes et internationales.
Dans ces circonstances, la participación ma à cette procédure judiciaire reviendrait à légitimer, contre ma volonté, honteuse farsa cette qui se déroule dans ce tribunal. Rechazar donc je de participer, de mon plein gré, à ce procès.
Vahagn Chakhalyan
16 octobre 2009
Si vous désirez de plus amples renseignements, contactez l'avocat de Vahagn Chakhalyan, Stepan Voskanyan, au (+374) 91 38 37 30.
Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-
sábado, 24 de octubre de 2009
Detras de las escenas del conflicto de Karabaj - traduccin automatica
Detrás de las escenas del conflicto de Karabaj ...
Cenk Started
actualizada sobre el tiempo de 3/9/2009
milliyet.com.tr
Acercamiento turco-armenio en el proceso de los problemas más básicos de Karabaj se menciona es que los armenios de Karabaj ciertamente no se quiere conectar de nuevo a Azerbaiyán. Bakú, en el enfoque Karabaj ciertamente no le da la independencia, sin embargo, en los últimos tiempos entre la solución, de acuerdo a los armenios de Karabaj de Azerbaiyán en la ciudad cerca de todos los de la mayor parte o de retirada de Karabaj y Armenia se conectará con un corredor, la cuestión del estatuto político que se deja a la vez
Armenia, Azerbaiyán y luego arrastrados a la guerra, los estados grandes en el Cáucaso trajo cara y recientemente la frontera turco-armenia en el acercamiento al proceso más que el nombre mencionado-Karabaj, la Unión Soviética heredó el más difícil y complejo es uno de los problemas étnicos.Repartidos en un área de 4500 kilómetros cuadrados en el sur del nombre de la región del Cáucaso es también polémica. Azerbaiyanos de la región, turco, "negro" y persa "unión" para reunir a las palabras "Karabaj", dice, los armenios "bosque fuerte" en el sentido de "Artsah" se llama. Los rusos, por Karabaj "montaña", que significa "Nagornıy" Yo añade. A lo largo de la historia, Turquía, Irán y Rusia se mantuvo bajo la influencia, la participación en el 1800s temprano, el Imperio Ruso en Karabaj, los armenios, azeríes son también reclamados. El Kremlin tras la revolución de 1917, los ciudadanos de diferentes orígenes étnicos "divide y vencerás" táctica y comenzó a administrar el resultado de esta política dio Karabaj a Azerbaiyán.Divide y vencerás!La Unión Soviética, Rusia, Kazajstán, Ucrania, Azerbaiyán, Armenia y Lituania, la República constaba de un total de 15, por ejemplo. Esta es también diferente en su república propia, donde las personas pertenecientes a minorías étnicas viven las repúblicas autónomas, que estaban separadas o regiones. En todas partes, creando una tensión potencial, por lo que el Kremlin, el centro de la oposición masiva contra la posible antes del comienzo se ha suprimido, y se utiliza un grupo étnico contra otro.Como bomba de tiempoEsta política funcionó durante 74 años de poder soviético. Los rusos de Moldavia, Osetia del İnguşlarla, los turcos mesjetios y uzbecos de vez en cuando los conflictos se han sucedido entre. Territorio de Azerbaiyán, más de tres cuartas partes de la población de los armenios de Nagorno-Karabaj, región autónoma de Azerbaiyán, que consiste en el corazón de la creación significaba poner una bomba de tiempo. Del mismo modo, en Armenia y Azerbaiyán no tienen ninguna conexión por tierra, se fundó la mayoría de los azeríes en la Región Autónoma de Najicheván.Explotó en 1988La mayoría de la población de Karabaj, 180 mil personas componen la vida de los armenios de Azerbaiyán causados debido a la tensión, el proceso de reforma política del líder soviético Mikhail Gorbachev lanzó que aflojó las cuerdas en 1988 y llegó a ser explosivo. Con el consejo local votó a favor de los armenios de Karabaj con Armenia tomó la decisión de fusionarse. Decisión ha creado un efecto de terremoto. Entre armenios y azeríes se inició la difusión del conflicto, con los azeríes en Nagorno-armenios que viven en Azerbaiyán huido de sus hogares por temor y el pánico se había hecho. La desintegración de la Unión Soviética oficialmente creado el caos en los armenios de Karabaj de Azerbaiyán en 1991, "oficialmente", declaró la independencia.Presidente de Azerbaiyán Ebülfeyz Elchibey, junio de 1992, que gana la elección no tendrá la Azeri-ejército-Karabaj y la otra mitad se hizo cargo de conquista de la región. Sin embargo, el ejército armenio, con el apoyo de los armenios de Karabaj tomó estas tierras de nuevo. En ese momento, ampliamente debatido en Azerbaiyán esta derrota intentando hacer las caídas de los círculos gobernantes de Elchibey de la reclamación que se ha planteado. Sobre todo el ministro de Defensa Rahim período Gaziyev fueron acusados. En 1993, apoyada por Moscú azerí presuntos rebeldes contra el coronel Copia Hüseyinov'un Elchibey iniciado durante el intento de golpe de Estado que apoya la retirada de la fachada de la unidad, los armenios de Karabaj, en la frontera a través de un lote de terreno sin luchar, casi nunca conquistadas.40 mil personas murieronArmenios Karabaj "rebelión en el proceso antes de la ayuda confidencial Soviética, el ejército de Rusia ha obtenido también se habla mucho. Como resultado, 40 mil personas murieron en el conflicto y después de la masacre, Baku, Karabaj y en torno al conjunto de las siete regiones (Kelbajar, Lachin, Kubat con Gabriel, Zengilan, Akdam y Fuzuli), que constituyen más del 20 por ciento del territorio perdido. Más de un millón de azeríes, el "fugitivo", que "los inmigrantes" con el estado cayó.En 1994, el acuerdo de paz de Nagorno fue firmado arabuluculuğunda Rusia Bishkek. En 1997, el presidente de Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosian de la época, un movimiento dirigido a resolver el problema de Karabaj. Sin embargo, la cabeza de Robert Kocharyan es eficaz para atraer-Karabaj de que la política de Armenia y de los políticos de origen, derrocó al ex comandante de inmediato.La independencia no conocía a nadieEn 2006 fue declarada la soberanía en un referéndum celebrado en Karabaj. La independencia de Karabaj hasta ahora no reconocida por ningún país, incluida Armenia.Organización para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa (OSCE), del Grupo de Minsk es debido, sus esfuerzos por resolver el conflicto de Karabaj, hasta mediados del año pasado fracasó. Después de la guerra ruso-georgiana, el punto de vista cambiantes de la región del Cáucaso en Moscú, tratando de mantener en el estante durante años para resolver la cuestión de Turquía con el apoyo de las iniciativas que comenzaron. El problema está bloqueado punto: volver a los armenios Karabaj a Azerbaiyán, definitivamente no se quiere conectar. La independencia de Karabaj a Bakú para dar absolutamente no se acercó.Un trabajo en el orden del díaSin embargo, últimamente muy discutido y se cree que tienen posibilidades de aplicación de la solución de acuerdo a la búsqueda, los armenios de Karabaj de alrededor de la totalidad o gran parte de la ciudad azerí de retirarse. Karabaj y Armenia se conectará con un corredor, el tiempo restante para la cuestión del status político. Petróleo y gas natural que se enriquece con Azerbaiyán, los armenios de Karabaj después de 15-20 años a raíz de las inversiones a realizar por cambiar las ideas sobre el papel, incluso si se puede re-up cuentas están conectados a Bakú. Armenia es la gestión, por resolver el problema de Karabaj, hasta ahora excluidos, como parte de la región para elevar el nivel de desarrollo y quiere venir en parte de la órbita de Rusia.
Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-
Cenk Started
actualizada sobre el tiempo de 3/9/2009
milliyet.com.tr
Acercamiento turco-armenio en el proceso de los problemas más básicos de Karabaj se menciona es que los armenios de Karabaj ciertamente no se quiere conectar de nuevo a Azerbaiyán. Bakú, en el enfoque Karabaj ciertamente no le da la independencia, sin embargo, en los últimos tiempos entre la solución, de acuerdo a los armenios de Karabaj de Azerbaiyán en la ciudad cerca de todos los de la mayor parte o de retirada de Karabaj y Armenia se conectará con un corredor, la cuestión del estatuto político que se deja a la vez
Armenia, Azerbaiyán y luego arrastrados a la guerra, los estados grandes en el Cáucaso trajo cara y recientemente la frontera turco-armenia en el acercamiento al proceso más que el nombre mencionado-Karabaj, la Unión Soviética heredó el más difícil y complejo es uno de los problemas étnicos.Repartidos en un área de 4500 kilómetros cuadrados en el sur del nombre de la región del Cáucaso es también polémica. Azerbaiyanos de la región, turco, "negro" y persa "unión" para reunir a las palabras "Karabaj", dice, los armenios "bosque fuerte" en el sentido de "Artsah" se llama. Los rusos, por Karabaj "montaña", que significa "Nagornıy" Yo añade. A lo largo de la historia, Turquía, Irán y Rusia se mantuvo bajo la influencia, la participación en el 1800s temprano, el Imperio Ruso en Karabaj, los armenios, azeríes son también reclamados. El Kremlin tras la revolución de 1917, los ciudadanos de diferentes orígenes étnicos "divide y vencerás" táctica y comenzó a administrar el resultado de esta política dio Karabaj a Azerbaiyán.Divide y vencerás!La Unión Soviética, Rusia, Kazajstán, Ucrania, Azerbaiyán, Armenia y Lituania, la República constaba de un total de 15, por ejemplo. Esta es también diferente en su república propia, donde las personas pertenecientes a minorías étnicas viven las repúblicas autónomas, que estaban separadas o regiones. En todas partes, creando una tensión potencial, por lo que el Kremlin, el centro de la oposición masiva contra la posible antes del comienzo se ha suprimido, y se utiliza un grupo étnico contra otro.Como bomba de tiempoEsta política funcionó durante 74 años de poder soviético. Los rusos de Moldavia, Osetia del İnguşlarla, los turcos mesjetios y uzbecos de vez en cuando los conflictos se han sucedido entre. Territorio de Azerbaiyán, más de tres cuartas partes de la población de los armenios de Nagorno-Karabaj, región autónoma de Azerbaiyán, que consiste en el corazón de la creación significaba poner una bomba de tiempo. Del mismo modo, en Armenia y Azerbaiyán no tienen ninguna conexión por tierra, se fundó la mayoría de los azeríes en la Región Autónoma de Najicheván.Explotó en 1988La mayoría de la población de Karabaj, 180 mil personas componen la vida de los armenios de Azerbaiyán causados debido a la tensión, el proceso de reforma política del líder soviético Mikhail Gorbachev lanzó que aflojó las cuerdas en 1988 y llegó a ser explosivo. Con el consejo local votó a favor de los armenios de Karabaj con Armenia tomó la decisión de fusionarse. Decisión ha creado un efecto de terremoto. Entre armenios y azeríes se inició la difusión del conflicto, con los azeríes en Nagorno-armenios que viven en Azerbaiyán huido de sus hogares por temor y el pánico se había hecho. La desintegración de la Unión Soviética oficialmente creado el caos en los armenios de Karabaj de Azerbaiyán en 1991, "oficialmente", declaró la independencia.Presidente de Azerbaiyán Ebülfeyz Elchibey, junio de 1992, que gana la elección no tendrá la Azeri-ejército-Karabaj y la otra mitad se hizo cargo de conquista de la región. Sin embargo, el ejército armenio, con el apoyo de los armenios de Karabaj tomó estas tierras de nuevo. En ese momento, ampliamente debatido en Azerbaiyán esta derrota intentando hacer las caídas de los círculos gobernantes de Elchibey de la reclamación que se ha planteado. Sobre todo el ministro de Defensa Rahim período Gaziyev fueron acusados. En 1993, apoyada por Moscú azerí presuntos rebeldes contra el coronel Copia Hüseyinov'un Elchibey iniciado durante el intento de golpe de Estado que apoya la retirada de la fachada de la unidad, los armenios de Karabaj, en la frontera a través de un lote de terreno sin luchar, casi nunca conquistadas.40 mil personas murieronArmenios Karabaj "rebelión en el proceso antes de la ayuda confidencial Soviética, el ejército de Rusia ha obtenido también se habla mucho. Como resultado, 40 mil personas murieron en el conflicto y después de la masacre, Baku, Karabaj y en torno al conjunto de las siete regiones (Kelbajar, Lachin, Kubat con Gabriel, Zengilan, Akdam y Fuzuli), que constituyen más del 20 por ciento del territorio perdido. Más de un millón de azeríes, el "fugitivo", que "los inmigrantes" con el estado cayó.En 1994, el acuerdo de paz de Nagorno fue firmado arabuluculuğunda Rusia Bishkek. En 1997, el presidente de Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosian de la época, un movimiento dirigido a resolver el problema de Karabaj. Sin embargo, la cabeza de Robert Kocharyan es eficaz para atraer-Karabaj de que la política de Armenia y de los políticos de origen, derrocó al ex comandante de inmediato.La independencia no conocía a nadieEn 2006 fue declarada la soberanía en un referéndum celebrado en Karabaj. La independencia de Karabaj hasta ahora no reconocida por ningún país, incluida Armenia.Organización para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa (OSCE), del Grupo de Minsk es debido, sus esfuerzos por resolver el conflicto de Karabaj, hasta mediados del año pasado fracasó. Después de la guerra ruso-georgiana, el punto de vista cambiantes de la región del Cáucaso en Moscú, tratando de mantener en el estante durante años para resolver la cuestión de Turquía con el apoyo de las iniciativas que comenzaron. El problema está bloqueado punto: volver a los armenios Karabaj a Azerbaiyán, definitivamente no se quiere conectar. La independencia de Karabaj a Bakú para dar absolutamente no se acercó.Un trabajo en el orden del díaSin embargo, últimamente muy discutido y se cree que tienen posibilidades de aplicación de la solución de acuerdo a la búsqueda, los armenios de Karabaj de alrededor de la totalidad o gran parte de la ciudad azerí de retirarse. Karabaj y Armenia se conectará con un corredor, el tiempo restante para la cuestión del status político. Petróleo y gas natural que se enriquece con Azerbaiyán, los armenios de Karabaj después de 15-20 años a raíz de las inversiones a realizar por cambiar las ideas sobre el papel, incluso si se puede re-up cuentas están conectados a Bakú. Armenia es la gestión, por resolver el problema de Karabaj, hasta ahora excluidos, como parte de la región para elevar el nivel de desarrollo y quiere venir en parte de la órbita de Rusia.
Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-
jueves, 22 de octubre de 2009
Remember to Forget
Remember to Forget
By Ofri Ilani , Haaretz.com, 16 October 2009
On a hill overlooking the Armenian capital Yerevan, a monument commemorates the murder of the Armenian people. Since the country gained independence in 1990, visiting foreign leaders are expected to stop at the monument and plant a tree in a small grove dedicated to the victims.
The first row of trees has plaques from Vladimir Putin, Jacques Chirac, Pope John Paul II and a few Eastern European leaders. There are none from Israeli or American leaders. In fact, so few leaders have agreed to recognize the genocide that starting in the second row, the site's patrons have had to make do with top officials from various organizations. One tree was planted by the chairman of the European dentists association, another by the president of the international weight lifting federation.
While denial of the European Jewish Holocaust produces international condemnations, many countries have a policy of not recognizing the Armenian genocide, which was perpetrated by the Turks. This is due not to a lack of documentation about the massacres, but to massive Turkish political pressure. Armenia, for its part, has waged a persistent - and in some cases successful - struggle demanding the rectification of this ongoing historic wrong.
This week saw a dramatic development in the long and bitter conflict between Turkey and Armenia. The two countries signed an agreement to open their border and establish normal diplomatic relations. The genocide is not mentioned anywhere in the historic accord.
"I am afraid that now countries will hesitate to recognize the genocide," says Prof. Yair Oron, a genocide expert from the Open University of Israel who has published several books about the Armenian genocide. "They will say: Why should we grant recognition if the Armenians yielded? Recognition of the Armenian genocide is a paramount moral and educational act. We in Israel are obliged to recognize it. I see this as a serious blow to those who are fighting for its recognition."
If the agreement is ratified by the parliaments of the two countries, it could prove highly beneficial for Armenia. The small country in the Caucasus is isolated politically and lacks access to the sea. Its economy is in a shambles, and its government is corrupt. After the departure of some one million citizens over the past two decades, the country has a population of only three million. In the absence of regional allies, Armenia is compelled to rely on neighboring Iran for support.
Economically and politically, then, the agreement with Turkey, which will give Armenia access to the sea, looks like a good deal for the tiny republic. Like the Israelis, the Armenians also want to vacation in Antalya, politics be damned. But in return for the border being opened, Armenia completely dropped its demands regarding the property of genocide victims and Armenian lands in much of present-day eastern Turkey.
Moreover, Armenia has effectively dropped its demand for recognition of the genocide itself, the cornerstone of Armenian national identity. Yerevan had to accept the demand Turkey has been making for years: for an "objective historical examination" about whether the genocide took place.
This first significant peace agreement signed under the auspices of U.S. President Barack Obama raises questions of principle: Does a country have the right to forgo its past for the sake of present needs? Can a political agreement lay down an official version of history? Is the establishment of a commission the way to come to terms with memory?
Starting at the end of the 19th century, the Armenian minority living in the Ottoman Empire was subject to persecution. Tens of thousands were killed. The event known as the "Armenian genocide" involved the systematic destruction of communities between 1915 and 1918. The massacre of the Armenians began after Ottoman forces lost several battles against czarist Russia. Armenian soldiers living under the czar had distinguished themselves in battle on the Russian side, and this became the pretext for the massacre of the Armenians living in what is now Turkey.
Following lengthy deliberations, the Ottoman government decided to resolve once and for all the "Armenian problem." First, the Turks drafted about a quarter of a million young Armenians into the army. They were then stripped of their uniforms, concentrated in labor battalions and murdered. On the night between April 23 and 24, 1915, Istanbul police arrested hundreds of Armenian leaders and intellectuals in their homes; 235 were executed. Thus the Armenian leadership was destroyed, leaving the community unable to organize.
At this stage, the Armenians living in the eastern regions of the Ottoman Empire began to be evacuated by a "special organization" of criminals and prisoners created for that purpose. People were rounded up in their villages and cities. The men were usually shot on the spot, while the women, children and elderly were sent on forced marches into the Syrian desert. On the way, they were attacked and robbed by Kurdish gangs. Hundreds of thousands marched to their death. In October 1915, the U.S. consul general in Aleppo reported to his government on one such march of 18,000 people; 70 days later, only 35 were still alive.
Governments received reports about the genocide while it was in progress, but most did nothing. Current estimates state that about a third of all Armenians, 1.2 million to 1.5 million, were annihilated. The Turks claim only 300,000 were killed, in what they call a defensive move against a fifth column that had joined the country's enemies. They say that no decision was ever made to wipe out the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.
"The Turks say: There was a war, there were battles and Armenians were killed, but so were Turks," says Oron. "It's true that the Turks did not espouse a racial doctrine like that of the Nazis, who set out to annihilate every Jew everywhere. And it is also important to say that there were cases in which Turks saved Armenians. But there was a policy of annihilating the Armenians and taking their property."
"Would the Jewish people be willing to forgo the memory of the Holocaust for the sake of good relations with Germany, if Germany were to make that demand?" asks Prof. Richard Hovannisian, a historian who has devoted the past 40 years to fighting denial of the Armenian genocide. The American-born Hovannisian, who teaches at UCLA, is the son of Armenian exiles from eastern Turkey. The family came from a village that was emptied by the Turks. Hovannisian has published many books on the genocide and is considered one of the world's leading authorities on the subject.
"The present agreement is the result of the fact that all the great powers wanted only for everyone to be good happy neighbors, irrespective of the price entailed," says Hovannisian, speaking by phone from California. "They want to do away with all the problems, but are not taking into account the victims' different perspectives."
Criticism from the diaspora
About two-thirds of Armenians live outside Armenia, mainly in Russia, the United States, France and the Middle East. Over the years complex relations have developed between Armenia, the small Caucasian state that was established after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Armenian diaspora. The Armenians living in the West send money to their homeland but can also be fiercely critical of it.
"I was disappointed. I expected the Armenian side to be more skillful in the negotiations," Hovannisian says. "It is clear that the government was under a great deal of pressure. Armenia is a small, isolated country. They are under siege, and it is only natural that they should want to be part of the world around them. But I think the government did not have the right to sign any agreement that accepts the present situation, which is the result of the genocide, as the normal state of affairs. The Armenian nation's present situation is the result of the Turkish expulsion and seizure of Armenian land. Even if we do not have the power to change this, I do not think we should recognize it. We have a moral obligation not to recognize it."
George Hintlian, former head of the Armenian community in Jerusalem, has a sharper response: "We in the Armenian diaspora are shocked. It is like an earthquake. It is the bankruptcy of international morality. They say there is reconciliation, but there is no recognition here by Turkey. It is a coerced agreement, which the world's powers forced on Armenia. Russia, which traditionally supported Armenia, is now drawing close to Turkey."
What is especially regrettable in this context, Hintlian says, is that in recent years recognition of the Armenian genocide has increased.
"Now they are placing the holocaust in doubt and saying, we will discuss it and see if it happened. It is impossible to know what the findings will be, what kind of formula they will reach. It is unlikely that the Turks will recognize the holocaust. The commission does not have a timetable, and in the meantime, after this commission is established, no country will take a stand on the Armenian genocide. Present-day Armenia is one-tenth the size of historic Armenia, and it has signed for its final borders without getting anything in return. "
Hintlian believes that the agreement's shortcomings far outweigh its advantages.
"The practical gain is the opening of the border and the lifting of the embargo," he says. "There was a physical embargo on Armenia, and now there is an embargo on the holocaust. The facts will not be buried, but the international discussion will suffer a blow."
Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-
By Ofri Ilani , Haaretz.com, 16 October 2009
On a hill overlooking the Armenian capital Yerevan, a monument commemorates the murder of the Armenian people. Since the country gained independence in 1990, visiting foreign leaders are expected to stop at the monument and plant a tree in a small grove dedicated to the victims.
The first row of trees has plaques from Vladimir Putin, Jacques Chirac, Pope John Paul II and a few Eastern European leaders. There are none from Israeli or American leaders. In fact, so few leaders have agreed to recognize the genocide that starting in the second row, the site's patrons have had to make do with top officials from various organizations. One tree was planted by the chairman of the European dentists association, another by the president of the international weight lifting federation.
While denial of the European Jewish Holocaust produces international condemnations, many countries have a policy of not recognizing the Armenian genocide, which was perpetrated by the Turks. This is due not to a lack of documentation about the massacres, but to massive Turkish political pressure. Armenia, for its part, has waged a persistent - and in some cases successful - struggle demanding the rectification of this ongoing historic wrong.
This week saw a dramatic development in the long and bitter conflict between Turkey and Armenia. The two countries signed an agreement to open their border and establish normal diplomatic relations. The genocide is not mentioned anywhere in the historic accord.
"I am afraid that now countries will hesitate to recognize the genocide," says Prof. Yair Oron, a genocide expert from the Open University of Israel who has published several books about the Armenian genocide. "They will say: Why should we grant recognition if the Armenians yielded? Recognition of the Armenian genocide is a paramount moral and educational act. We in Israel are obliged to recognize it. I see this as a serious blow to those who are fighting for its recognition."
If the agreement is ratified by the parliaments of the two countries, it could prove highly beneficial for Armenia. The small country in the Caucasus is isolated politically and lacks access to the sea. Its economy is in a shambles, and its government is corrupt. After the departure of some one million citizens over the past two decades, the country has a population of only three million. In the absence of regional allies, Armenia is compelled to rely on neighboring Iran for support.
Economically and politically, then, the agreement with Turkey, which will give Armenia access to the sea, looks like a good deal for the tiny republic. Like the Israelis, the Armenians also want to vacation in Antalya, politics be damned. But in return for the border being opened, Armenia completely dropped its demands regarding the property of genocide victims and Armenian lands in much of present-day eastern Turkey.
Moreover, Armenia has effectively dropped its demand for recognition of the genocide itself, the cornerstone of Armenian national identity. Yerevan had to accept the demand Turkey has been making for years: for an "objective historical examination" about whether the genocide took place.
This first significant peace agreement signed under the auspices of U.S. President Barack Obama raises questions of principle: Does a country have the right to forgo its past for the sake of present needs? Can a political agreement lay down an official version of history? Is the establishment of a commission the way to come to terms with memory?
Starting at the end of the 19th century, the Armenian minority living in the Ottoman Empire was subject to persecution. Tens of thousands were killed. The event known as the "Armenian genocide" involved the systematic destruction of communities between 1915 and 1918. The massacre of the Armenians began after Ottoman forces lost several battles against czarist Russia. Armenian soldiers living under the czar had distinguished themselves in battle on the Russian side, and this became the pretext for the massacre of the Armenians living in what is now Turkey.
Following lengthy deliberations, the Ottoman government decided to resolve once and for all the "Armenian problem." First, the Turks drafted about a quarter of a million young Armenians into the army. They were then stripped of their uniforms, concentrated in labor battalions and murdered. On the night between April 23 and 24, 1915, Istanbul police arrested hundreds of Armenian leaders and intellectuals in their homes; 235 were executed. Thus the Armenian leadership was destroyed, leaving the community unable to organize.
At this stage, the Armenians living in the eastern regions of the Ottoman Empire began to be evacuated by a "special organization" of criminals and prisoners created for that purpose. People were rounded up in their villages and cities. The men were usually shot on the spot, while the women, children and elderly were sent on forced marches into the Syrian desert. On the way, they were attacked and robbed by Kurdish gangs. Hundreds of thousands marched to their death. In October 1915, the U.S. consul general in Aleppo reported to his government on one such march of 18,000 people; 70 days later, only 35 were still alive.
Governments received reports about the genocide while it was in progress, but most did nothing. Current estimates state that about a third of all Armenians, 1.2 million to 1.5 million, were annihilated. The Turks claim only 300,000 were killed, in what they call a defensive move against a fifth column that had joined the country's enemies. They say that no decision was ever made to wipe out the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.
"The Turks say: There was a war, there were battles and Armenians were killed, but so were Turks," says Oron. "It's true that the Turks did not espouse a racial doctrine like that of the Nazis, who set out to annihilate every Jew everywhere. And it is also important to say that there were cases in which Turks saved Armenians. But there was a policy of annihilating the Armenians and taking their property."
"Would the Jewish people be willing to forgo the memory of the Holocaust for the sake of good relations with Germany, if Germany were to make that demand?" asks Prof. Richard Hovannisian, a historian who has devoted the past 40 years to fighting denial of the Armenian genocide. The American-born Hovannisian, who teaches at UCLA, is the son of Armenian exiles from eastern Turkey. The family came from a village that was emptied by the Turks. Hovannisian has published many books on the genocide and is considered one of the world's leading authorities on the subject.
"The present agreement is the result of the fact that all the great powers wanted only for everyone to be good happy neighbors, irrespective of the price entailed," says Hovannisian, speaking by phone from California. "They want to do away with all the problems, but are not taking into account the victims' different perspectives."
Criticism from the diaspora
About two-thirds of Armenians live outside Armenia, mainly in Russia, the United States, France and the Middle East. Over the years complex relations have developed between Armenia, the small Caucasian state that was established after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Armenian diaspora. The Armenians living in the West send money to their homeland but can also be fiercely critical of it.
"I was disappointed. I expected the Armenian side to be more skillful in the negotiations," Hovannisian says. "It is clear that the government was under a great deal of pressure. Armenia is a small, isolated country. They are under siege, and it is only natural that they should want to be part of the world around them. But I think the government did not have the right to sign any agreement that accepts the present situation, which is the result of the genocide, as the normal state of affairs. The Armenian nation's present situation is the result of the Turkish expulsion and seizure of Armenian land. Even if we do not have the power to change this, I do not think we should recognize it. We have a moral obligation not to recognize it."
George Hintlian, former head of the Armenian community in Jerusalem, has a sharper response: "We in the Armenian diaspora are shocked. It is like an earthquake. It is the bankruptcy of international morality. They say there is reconciliation, but there is no recognition here by Turkey. It is a coerced agreement, which the world's powers forced on Armenia. Russia, which traditionally supported Armenia, is now drawing close to Turkey."
What is especially regrettable in this context, Hintlian says, is that in recent years recognition of the Armenian genocide has increased.
"Now they are placing the holocaust in doubt and saying, we will discuss it and see if it happened. It is impossible to know what the findings will be, what kind of formula they will reach. It is unlikely that the Turks will recognize the holocaust. The commission does not have a timetable, and in the meantime, after this commission is established, no country will take a stand on the Armenian genocide. Present-day Armenia is one-tenth the size of historic Armenia, and it has signed for its final borders without getting anything in return. "
Hintlian believes that the agreement's shortcomings far outweigh its advantages.
"The practical gain is the opening of the border and the lifting of the embargo," he says. "There was a physical embargo on Armenia, and now there is an embargo on the holocaust. The facts will not be buried, but the international discussion will suffer a blow."
Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-
Concerning Nagorno - Karabakn
PUBLICATIONS IN AMERICAN PERIODICALS CONCERNING NAGORNO-KARABAKH IN 1918-20 Haykaram Nahapetyan
On March 29 of this year on Azerbaijani day.az portal the publication appeared, according to which in the archive of “New York Times” the article was found where Karabakh and Zangezur were mentioned as parts of Mousavatist Azerbaijan (http://day.az/news/politics/151388.html). As Artsakh neither in the mentioned years nor ever has been a part of Azerbaijan (including the fact that the independent Azerbaijan had never existed before May 28, 1918) it remains to find out the backgrounds of another disinformation. It is worth mentioning what “New York Times” and other authoritative American media wrote about Nagorno-Karabakh during the short period of independence of the South Caucasus republics. Thus, day.az cites the “New York Times” publication of August 4, 1920 in which it is mentioned that “Karabakh and Zangezur populated by the Armenians were cut off the rest of the Republic of Armenia and were not controlled by the Armenian authorities due to the absence of the roads and communications”1. Azerbaijani propaganda machine qualified this information no less than “a historical proof that those territories belonged to the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan” though the word “Azerbaijan” is not even mentioned in that media report. The fact that the Azerbaijani propaganda machine failed to find in the American archives any publication where Artsakh is clearly mentioned as a part of Azerbaijan is rather conspicuous. The most the Azerbaijani propagandists could find and slant to their false thesis was the aforementioned publication. And what did the American press publish about Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-20 in reality?
In the “Chicago Daily Tribune” issue of July 31, 1919 we can read the telegram of the American army officer Major Joseph Green who was working in Tiflis to the Director General of «Neat East Relief» humanitarian organization Herbert Hoover who was in Paris at that time at the Peace conference. Later, in 1929-1933 Hoover became the 31st president of the USA.
“The Turkish army well prepared and Tartars are advancing from 3 sides…They have cut off the Armenian relief supplies and threaten all the remaining Armenians with the extradition”. According to daily, “Herbert Hoover, the Director-general of the relief, immediately submitted Maj Green’s message to the peace conference, which already had similar reports from other American or British observers”. “The disaster will be more terrible than the massacres in 1915 and the Armenian nation will be crushed, to the everlasting shame of allies…General mobilization was ordered yesterday…We shall no be able to carry on relief work much longer unless British troops receive orders to clear all Russian Armenia, including Karabagh and Alaghez, of Turkish and Tartar forces”2, - wrote Major Green
In the issue of “Atlanta Constitution” of the same date we read: ““The Turks and Tartars are advancing in the districts of Karabagh and Alaghez. They now occupy approximately the territory of Russian Armenia. General mobilization was ordered yesterday”3.
Naturally, the “Tatars” and not “Azerbaijanis” ethnicon is used in the publication of the American press. The latter was put into circulation only at the end of 1936 on Stalin’s initiative. Even more in those two particular publications the unauthentic “Tartar” variant was used. In 1918-20s in the American press the ehtnicon “Tartar” was used instead of “Tatar”.
In “Christian Science Monitor” periodical of August 5, 1919 it is mentioned: “Karabagh is inhabited exclusively by Armenians, and was formerly practically independent and self-governing”4. The citation from the same newspaper of August 28: “The cause of the trouble is said to be apparently political, due to the desire of Tartars to annex the Armenian province of Karabagh to the Tartar Republic of Azerbaijan. The information from Paris gives the following details: “it was on June 4 at 3 o’clock in the morning, that the Armed forces of the Tartar government of Azerbaijan directed by Dr Soultanoff, who had been imposed by force as governor of Armenian Karabagh, began the attack upon the city of Chouci, the capital of Karabagh”5.
In the issue of the newspaper of September 2 we can read: “Some weeks ago, it will be remembered, Major Green who is directing the work of the American Relief association at Tiflis, dispatched message to Mr. Hoover – describing how the Turks and the Tartars were advancing on the Armenian district of Karabagh. Already the most carefully organized massacres have been carried out at Chouci, the capital of Karabagh” 6.
Just in a year when the 11th Red Army was in Caucasus American press informed of the aspiration of Moscow to establish Soviet order in Armenia. In “Bolsheviki advance into Armenia” publication in “Washington Post: 20.07.1920 ” it is mentioned:“The Armenian Government having refused to obey an ultimatum of the Russian Soviet Government, the Bolshevik army has received orders to advance and already has occupied province of Karabagh” 7. The Sovietization of Azerbaijan took place on April 28, 1920, meanwhile Russian army moved forward to Artsakh in July, and this is another puzzle for the Azerbaijani propagandists to present the lie that Karabakh was a part of Mousavatist Azerbaijan to their own and international communities. On July 26 “New York Times” develops the theme: “Considerable Russian Bolshevist forces, chiefly cavalry, are overrunning the Karabagh district of Armenia apparently with the purpose of joining the Turkish Nationalists”8. Here is the citation from “Atlanta Chronicles” of the same date: “Considerable Russian Bolshevik forces, chiefly cavalry, are overrunning the Karabagh district of Armenia … The Turkish Nationalists and the Bolsheviki approaching Shusha”9.
On August 2 “New York Times” wrote: “Bolshevist penetration of Armenia is continuing, according to late advices received here. The provinces of Karabagh and Zangezour, it is stated, established Soviet governments on July 20” 10.
And on March 16, 1921 when Armenia temporarily regained its independency “New York Times” wrote: “A radio telegram from Simon Vratian, President of the Armenian cabinet, dated March 7 at Erivan, announces that the Bolsheviki are completely beaten and that all the country from Karabagh to Alagheuz – that is to say, all the territory not occupied by the Turks – is now administrated by our government” 11.
Other examples can be brought. In the citations from more than a dozen of articles Nagorno-Karabakh is clearly defined as historically Armenian territory and a constituent part of Armenia from political point of view, and Baku is presented as the aggressor which aspired to annex Nagorno-Karabakh to the Tatar Azerbaijan. As we can see American officer Joseph Green saw the connection between the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the attempts to annihilate the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1919-1920. This is another fact which proves that at the end of the 20th century the Armenians of Artsakh fought exclusively for their self-defence and averted the threat of new genocide at the end of the 20th century. And the references to “New York Times” in its aspiration to present Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur as their historical territories is another manifestation of the Azerbaijani disinformation in which Baku, in fact, tries to profit from the name of the authoritative international media.
1Doubt Armenia is invaded, “New York Times”, 04.08.1920.
2Turks, Tatars peril Armenia, “Chicago Daily Tribune”, 31.07.1919.
3Turks move to Butcher Armenians, “The Atlanta Constitution”, 31.07.1919.
4Maasacre reported of 200 Armenians. “Christian Science Monitor”, 05.08.1919.
5Tartars and Kurds slay Armenians, “Christian Science Monitor”, 28.08.1919.
6Armenia again, “Christian Science Monitor”, 02.09.1919.
7Bolsheviki advance into Armenia. Will give aid to Turks, “The Washington Post” July 20, 1920.
8Bolsheviki marching to join Turks, “New York Times”, July 26, 1920.
9Bolshevik forces appear in Armenia, “The Atlanta constitution” 26.07.1920.
10Soviet invites Djemal pasha to lead Musulman reds, “New York Times”, August 2, 1920.
11Greeks said to plan new drive on Turks, “New York Times”, 16.03.1921
Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-
On March 29 of this year on Azerbaijani day.az portal the publication appeared, according to which in the archive of “New York Times” the article was found where Karabakh and Zangezur were mentioned as parts of Mousavatist Azerbaijan (http://day.az/news/politics/151388.html). As Artsakh neither in the mentioned years nor ever has been a part of Azerbaijan (including the fact that the independent Azerbaijan had never existed before May 28, 1918) it remains to find out the backgrounds of another disinformation. It is worth mentioning what “New York Times” and other authoritative American media wrote about Nagorno-Karabakh during the short period of independence of the South Caucasus republics. Thus, day.az cites the “New York Times” publication of August 4, 1920 in which it is mentioned that “Karabakh and Zangezur populated by the Armenians were cut off the rest of the Republic of Armenia and were not controlled by the Armenian authorities due to the absence of the roads and communications”1. Azerbaijani propaganda machine qualified this information no less than “a historical proof that those territories belonged to the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan” though the word “Azerbaijan” is not even mentioned in that media report. The fact that the Azerbaijani propaganda machine failed to find in the American archives any publication where Artsakh is clearly mentioned as a part of Azerbaijan is rather conspicuous. The most the Azerbaijani propagandists could find and slant to their false thesis was the aforementioned publication. And what did the American press publish about Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-20 in reality?
In the “Chicago Daily Tribune” issue of July 31, 1919 we can read the telegram of the American army officer Major Joseph Green who was working in Tiflis to the Director General of «Neat East Relief» humanitarian organization Herbert Hoover who was in Paris at that time at the Peace conference. Later, in 1929-1933 Hoover became the 31st president of the USA.
“The Turkish army well prepared and Tartars are advancing from 3 sides…They have cut off the Armenian relief supplies and threaten all the remaining Armenians with the extradition”. According to daily, “Herbert Hoover, the Director-general of the relief, immediately submitted Maj Green’s message to the peace conference, which already had similar reports from other American or British observers”. “The disaster will be more terrible than the massacres in 1915 and the Armenian nation will be crushed, to the everlasting shame of allies…General mobilization was ordered yesterday…We shall no be able to carry on relief work much longer unless British troops receive orders to clear all Russian Armenia, including Karabagh and Alaghez, of Turkish and Tartar forces”2, - wrote Major Green
In the issue of “Atlanta Constitution” of the same date we read: ““The Turks and Tartars are advancing in the districts of Karabagh and Alaghez. They now occupy approximately the territory of Russian Armenia. General mobilization was ordered yesterday”3.
Naturally, the “Tatars” and not “Azerbaijanis” ethnicon is used in the publication of the American press. The latter was put into circulation only at the end of 1936 on Stalin’s initiative. Even more in those two particular publications the unauthentic “Tartar” variant was used. In 1918-20s in the American press the ehtnicon “Tartar” was used instead of “Tatar”.
In “Christian Science Monitor” periodical of August 5, 1919 it is mentioned: “Karabagh is inhabited exclusively by Armenians, and was formerly practically independent and self-governing”4. The citation from the same newspaper of August 28: “The cause of the trouble is said to be apparently political, due to the desire of Tartars to annex the Armenian province of Karabagh to the Tartar Republic of Azerbaijan. The information from Paris gives the following details: “it was on June 4 at 3 o’clock in the morning, that the Armed forces of the Tartar government of Azerbaijan directed by Dr Soultanoff, who had been imposed by force as governor of Armenian Karabagh, began the attack upon the city of Chouci, the capital of Karabagh”5.
In the issue of the newspaper of September 2 we can read: “Some weeks ago, it will be remembered, Major Green who is directing the work of the American Relief association at Tiflis, dispatched message to Mr. Hoover – describing how the Turks and the Tartars were advancing on the Armenian district of Karabagh. Already the most carefully organized massacres have been carried out at Chouci, the capital of Karabagh” 6.
Just in a year when the 11th Red Army was in Caucasus American press informed of the aspiration of Moscow to establish Soviet order in Armenia. In “Bolsheviki advance into Armenia” publication in “Washington Post: 20.07.1920 ” it is mentioned:“The Armenian Government having refused to obey an ultimatum of the Russian Soviet Government, the Bolshevik army has received orders to advance and already has occupied province of Karabagh” 7. The Sovietization of Azerbaijan took place on April 28, 1920, meanwhile Russian army moved forward to Artsakh in July, and this is another puzzle for the Azerbaijani propagandists to present the lie that Karabakh was a part of Mousavatist Azerbaijan to their own and international communities. On July 26 “New York Times” develops the theme: “Considerable Russian Bolshevist forces, chiefly cavalry, are overrunning the Karabagh district of Armenia apparently with the purpose of joining the Turkish Nationalists”8. Here is the citation from “Atlanta Chronicles” of the same date: “Considerable Russian Bolshevik forces, chiefly cavalry, are overrunning the Karabagh district of Armenia … The Turkish Nationalists and the Bolsheviki approaching Shusha”9.
On August 2 “New York Times” wrote: “Bolshevist penetration of Armenia is continuing, according to late advices received here. The provinces of Karabagh and Zangezour, it is stated, established Soviet governments on July 20” 10.
And on March 16, 1921 when Armenia temporarily regained its independency “New York Times” wrote: “A radio telegram from Simon Vratian, President of the Armenian cabinet, dated March 7 at Erivan, announces that the Bolsheviki are completely beaten and that all the country from Karabagh to Alagheuz – that is to say, all the territory not occupied by the Turks – is now administrated by our government” 11.
Other examples can be brought. In the citations from more than a dozen of articles Nagorno-Karabakh is clearly defined as historically Armenian territory and a constituent part of Armenia from political point of view, and Baku is presented as the aggressor which aspired to annex Nagorno-Karabakh to the Tatar Azerbaijan. As we can see American officer Joseph Green saw the connection between the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the attempts to annihilate the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1919-1920. This is another fact which proves that at the end of the 20th century the Armenians of Artsakh fought exclusively for their self-defence and averted the threat of new genocide at the end of the 20th century. And the references to “New York Times” in its aspiration to present Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur as their historical territories is another manifestation of the Azerbaijani disinformation in which Baku, in fact, tries to profit from the name of the authoritative international media.
1Doubt Armenia is invaded, “New York Times”, 04.08.1920.
2Turks, Tatars peril Armenia, “Chicago Daily Tribune”, 31.07.1919.
3Turks move to Butcher Armenians, “The Atlanta Constitution”, 31.07.1919.
4Maasacre reported of 200 Armenians. “Christian Science Monitor”, 05.08.1919.
5Tartars and Kurds slay Armenians, “Christian Science Monitor”, 28.08.1919.
6Armenia again, “Christian Science Monitor”, 02.09.1919.
7Bolsheviki advance into Armenia. Will give aid to Turks, “The Washington Post” July 20, 1920.
8Bolsheviki marching to join Turks, “New York Times”, July 26, 1920.
9Bolshevik forces appear in Armenia, “The Atlanta constitution” 26.07.1920.
10Soviet invites Djemal pasha to lead Musulman reds, “New York Times”, August 2, 1920.
11Greeks said to plan new drive on Turks, “New York Times”, 16.03.1921
Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-
miércoles, 21 de octubre de 2009
Do the protocols Bridge any Divides ???
Do the Protocols Bridge any Divides?The Turkey-Armenia Agreementdr harry hagopian
In a BBC radio interview on Sunday Sequence last week, I was asked for an assessment on the geopolitical as much as human impact of the recent agreement between Turkey and Armenia, and whether the signing of the two protocols will lead - at least on paper - to a normalisation of relations between these two unfriendly neighbours or at least open the common border that has been closed off unilaterally by Turkey since 1993.
What could I tell the programme presenter that I had not already incorporated into my Open Letter of 6th October to Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan? Were those issues not also adequately covered in the open letters, statements, analyses and opinions of many organisations and individuals alike? Had the Armenian National Committee of Canada, for instance, not dissected in five key points the two protocols and concluded that they were deeply flawed in nature? What about the writings of Raffi K Hovannisian and Vartan Oskanian, two seasoned politicians and former government ministers in Armenia? Had Hovannisian not asserted in his Protocols and Preconditions of 12th October that “in this millennial series of misfortunes”, the Armenian nation had never yet invited such destruction upon itself? Had Oskanian not also concluded on 14th October that “normalisation of Armenia-Turkey relations, as an idea even, has been discredited” and that it “has thus begun with the capitulation of the Armenian side”? But perhaps a most telling - and in its own right a most powerful - articulation was the short but incisive 8th October open letter to the Turkish and Armenian leaders by Professor William Schabas, an Irish-Canadian law professor, and president of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, who expressed the wariness of the IAGS “of any call for allegedly impartial research into what are clearly established historical facts” and added that “acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide must be the starting point of any ‘impartial historical commission’ and not one of its possible conclusions”.
In the final analysis, I believe this fragile agreement that was shrouded in mystery till the eleventh hour is more a marriage of convenience imposed upon two South Caucasian neighbours by outside matchmakers than a real desire for reconciliation between them. It is certainly not a case of Armenia and Turkey wishing to establish good - in the classical sense of co-equal - neighbourly relations, but rather one of geopolitical realities being dictated upon them. If the real purpose of the exercise were to reach reconciliation, then the truth should not have been shunned so maladroitly by both sides. Let me take just three examples to mark the distinction between expediency, reconciliation and truth in international relations. In the case of the Jewish Holocaust, which is genocide by another name, did Germany not recognise its heinous crimes and make good upon this chapter in its history during WWII? After all, it did not create a historical sub-commission to examine established facts, but rather recognised its crimes and made reparations for them. And if I were to look further at South Africa, with its Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1995, or perhaps even closer to home in Northern Ireland with the Good Friday / Belfast Agreement 1998, where erstwhile historical enemies worked together and admitted their mistakes, surely the paradox with the latest Turkey-Armenia agreement becomes even more self-evident in both its simplicity and duplicity. The simplicity is that the establishment of diplomatic relations between any two countries would require a mere - and familiar - template that is used universally and not two protocols with preconditions, commissions or omissions! The duplicity, on the other hand, is that such an agreement cannot be heralded as reconciliation when it brazenly obfuscates the truth and strays quite far from it. Indeed, by listening to President Sargsyan’s address last week when he placed the protocols in the context of Armenian rights and interests, not only did he fail to convince me with his arguments but in fact succeeded to underline why Armenia in the person of its foreign minister should not have signed the agreement as it stands today.
But the fact remains that those protocols have been signed in a rather self-conscious ceremony in Zürich that housed a smiling Turkish foreign minister, a less-than-smiling Armenian foreign minister, the clapping presence of the American, French and Russian foreign ministers as OSCE Minsk Group co-chair representatives, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Swiss host. Mind you, Turkey had every right to be smiling, as it avoided a last-minute glitch and deftly managed to pull off a political rabbit from its Ottoman fez. What now remains to be seen is whether the respective Turkish and Armenian parliaments will ratify this agreement in toto since they do not enjoy the right to amend or alter it, whether the border will eventually be opened so that Armenia acquires at long last an access to the sea, and whether the putative economic gains - a moot point for me actually - will filter down to the ordinary and needy people in Armenia. After all, I would suggest that an open border is at the very least as beneficial to Turkey as it is to Armenia since the former can trade in the Armenian market with cheap Turkish products, let alone invest in the country or even acquire Armenian national assets.But in the scroll of winners and losers from those two Turkey-Armenia protocols, it is almost a non-sequitur to argue that Turkey has largely neutralised Armenian efforts at lobbying for recognition of the genocide, found a market for its goods and also appeared to be a statesmanlike peace-builder which would earn it a few brownie points with the EU just in case its accession hopes are revalidated later. And while many people would also talk of the USA and the EU in terms of win-win or win-lose situations, what still surprises me is the eerie absence in the documents and commentaries coming out of politicians and pundits to date of the fact that the Russian Federation is another major benefactor of this agreement. This is why I would suggest that it will have exercised ample “friendly pressure” upon its ally Armenia to sign those two protocols. Following the Russian-Georgian war, and the new geopolitical shifts in the whole region, this agreement would not only facilitate its policies on oil and gas supplies and the route of its pipelines, it would also strengthen its influence in the region as well as wean oil-rich Azerbaijan just a tad away from Turkey and into its sphere of influence - as has been manifested by the successive visits to Baku by Russian political leaders.
Another crucial issue looming very much in the background of this agreement is the conflict in Nagorny-Karabagh. Again, as I wrote recently in my Open Letter, I remain quite convinced that Turkey will now use its “gains” from those protocols as a trump card to counter the “stalemate” in this conflict by coercing Armenia to settle with Azerbaijan. In fact, there is already some talk in the political corridors of the OSCE Minsk Group of a possible breakthrough between Armenia and Azerbaijan over a framework agreement on basic principles that was initially outlined in 2005. In fact, and in view of the surprise element of the two protocols when the Diaspora was for all intents and purposes ambushed by them without prior consultation, there is now mounting concern that Armenia would again be pressured to give up the occupied territories (which it should do eventually anyway) in exchange for mere promises of security (which it should certainly not accept on its own minus any concrete return). Yet, this breakthrough looks rather premature to me, more so in view of the increased frequency in armed skirmishes between both sides. However, once the negotiations - and concomitant pressures - become more critical over self-determination, or about an Armenian pullout or even over the corridor linking Armenia to Nagorny-Karabagh, I hope the Armenian politicians and their mandarins will be more prudent when they discuss the final outcome than what they did with the two protocols signed in Zürich last week.
But let me add a couple of correctives here. Many people today are claiming that this agreement dealt a fatal blow to the issue of recognition of the Armenian Genocide, and that countries from the USA to Israel will no longer have to recognise it since the Armenia government will be “implementing an impartial and scientific examination” over its historical veracity. Much as there is a modicum of truth in this postulation, I would nonetheless add that the issue of recognition will not die away since it remains a Diasporan priority that voters in the USA and elsewhere will continue to lobby for and perhaps even at a higher pitch - irrespective of any political protocols between Turkey and Armenia. So I would suggest that President Obama has not been let off the hook, as Armenian-American voters and their supporters will ensure that their demands remain audible. But as a lawyer, let me play the devil’s advocate and refer to an idea I was discussing earlier with the Armenian-British author George Jerjian. Is it remotely possible that this provision in the protocol is solely a smokescreen to help Turkey save face before “accepting” the recommendations of the said commission that genocide occurred in fact? Or is this too wild a theory even by Machiavellian standards?
In the final analysis, one regrettable collateral damage from those protocols is that scores of ordinary Armenian men and women worldwide who have been hardy supporters of normalisation with Turkey are now being labelled extremists, loudmouths or nationalists simply because they seek an agreement that is credible, equitable, mutually-beneficial and sustainable rather than one that is based on indignity, injustice, disequilibrium and non-sustainability. No amount of football matches in Yerevan (present capital of Armenia) or Bursa (former capital of the Ottoman Empire) could erase from the minds of countless peoples that this agreement lacks adequate moral as much as political probity and that its far-reaching and long-term ramifications are as unsettling as they are unclear.
But how will we Armenians be spared the disturbing fallout of those protocols when there is so much disappointment and some anger, and how will we also ensure that the yawning gap between the Armenian Republic and the Armenian Diaspora does not ricochet dangerously beyond control and arrest our collective future hopes? Will we manage to bridge any of the divides through public diplomacy and people-to-people contacts to ensure real reconciliation?
Therein lies in my opinion the next existential challenge that confronts us all, one that goes even beyond Mount Ararat and genocide, and it should have perhaps been the real question from the BBC presenter to me last Sunday.
© hbv-H @ 15 October 2009
Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-
In a BBC radio interview on Sunday Sequence last week, I was asked for an assessment on the geopolitical as much as human impact of the recent agreement between Turkey and Armenia, and whether the signing of the two protocols will lead - at least on paper - to a normalisation of relations between these two unfriendly neighbours or at least open the common border that has been closed off unilaterally by Turkey since 1993.
What could I tell the programme presenter that I had not already incorporated into my Open Letter of 6th October to Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan? Were those issues not also adequately covered in the open letters, statements, analyses and opinions of many organisations and individuals alike? Had the Armenian National Committee of Canada, for instance, not dissected in five key points the two protocols and concluded that they were deeply flawed in nature? What about the writings of Raffi K Hovannisian and Vartan Oskanian, two seasoned politicians and former government ministers in Armenia? Had Hovannisian not asserted in his Protocols and Preconditions of 12th October that “in this millennial series of misfortunes”, the Armenian nation had never yet invited such destruction upon itself? Had Oskanian not also concluded on 14th October that “normalisation of Armenia-Turkey relations, as an idea even, has been discredited” and that it “has thus begun with the capitulation of the Armenian side”? But perhaps a most telling - and in its own right a most powerful - articulation was the short but incisive 8th October open letter to the Turkish and Armenian leaders by Professor William Schabas, an Irish-Canadian law professor, and president of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, who expressed the wariness of the IAGS “of any call for allegedly impartial research into what are clearly established historical facts” and added that “acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide must be the starting point of any ‘impartial historical commission’ and not one of its possible conclusions”.
In the final analysis, I believe this fragile agreement that was shrouded in mystery till the eleventh hour is more a marriage of convenience imposed upon two South Caucasian neighbours by outside matchmakers than a real desire for reconciliation between them. It is certainly not a case of Armenia and Turkey wishing to establish good - in the classical sense of co-equal - neighbourly relations, but rather one of geopolitical realities being dictated upon them. If the real purpose of the exercise were to reach reconciliation, then the truth should not have been shunned so maladroitly by both sides. Let me take just three examples to mark the distinction between expediency, reconciliation and truth in international relations. In the case of the Jewish Holocaust, which is genocide by another name, did Germany not recognise its heinous crimes and make good upon this chapter in its history during WWII? After all, it did not create a historical sub-commission to examine established facts, but rather recognised its crimes and made reparations for them. And if I were to look further at South Africa, with its Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1995, or perhaps even closer to home in Northern Ireland with the Good Friday / Belfast Agreement 1998, where erstwhile historical enemies worked together and admitted their mistakes, surely the paradox with the latest Turkey-Armenia agreement becomes even more self-evident in both its simplicity and duplicity. The simplicity is that the establishment of diplomatic relations between any two countries would require a mere - and familiar - template that is used universally and not two protocols with preconditions, commissions or omissions! The duplicity, on the other hand, is that such an agreement cannot be heralded as reconciliation when it brazenly obfuscates the truth and strays quite far from it. Indeed, by listening to President Sargsyan’s address last week when he placed the protocols in the context of Armenian rights and interests, not only did he fail to convince me with his arguments but in fact succeeded to underline why Armenia in the person of its foreign minister should not have signed the agreement as it stands today.
But the fact remains that those protocols have been signed in a rather self-conscious ceremony in Zürich that housed a smiling Turkish foreign minister, a less-than-smiling Armenian foreign minister, the clapping presence of the American, French and Russian foreign ministers as OSCE Minsk Group co-chair representatives, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Swiss host. Mind you, Turkey had every right to be smiling, as it avoided a last-minute glitch and deftly managed to pull off a political rabbit from its Ottoman fez. What now remains to be seen is whether the respective Turkish and Armenian parliaments will ratify this agreement in toto since they do not enjoy the right to amend or alter it, whether the border will eventually be opened so that Armenia acquires at long last an access to the sea, and whether the putative economic gains - a moot point for me actually - will filter down to the ordinary and needy people in Armenia. After all, I would suggest that an open border is at the very least as beneficial to Turkey as it is to Armenia since the former can trade in the Armenian market with cheap Turkish products, let alone invest in the country or even acquire Armenian national assets.But in the scroll of winners and losers from those two Turkey-Armenia protocols, it is almost a non-sequitur to argue that Turkey has largely neutralised Armenian efforts at lobbying for recognition of the genocide, found a market for its goods and also appeared to be a statesmanlike peace-builder which would earn it a few brownie points with the EU just in case its accession hopes are revalidated later. And while many people would also talk of the USA and the EU in terms of win-win or win-lose situations, what still surprises me is the eerie absence in the documents and commentaries coming out of politicians and pundits to date of the fact that the Russian Federation is another major benefactor of this agreement. This is why I would suggest that it will have exercised ample “friendly pressure” upon its ally Armenia to sign those two protocols. Following the Russian-Georgian war, and the new geopolitical shifts in the whole region, this agreement would not only facilitate its policies on oil and gas supplies and the route of its pipelines, it would also strengthen its influence in the region as well as wean oil-rich Azerbaijan just a tad away from Turkey and into its sphere of influence - as has been manifested by the successive visits to Baku by Russian political leaders.
Another crucial issue looming very much in the background of this agreement is the conflict in Nagorny-Karabagh. Again, as I wrote recently in my Open Letter, I remain quite convinced that Turkey will now use its “gains” from those protocols as a trump card to counter the “stalemate” in this conflict by coercing Armenia to settle with Azerbaijan. In fact, there is already some talk in the political corridors of the OSCE Minsk Group of a possible breakthrough between Armenia and Azerbaijan over a framework agreement on basic principles that was initially outlined in 2005. In fact, and in view of the surprise element of the two protocols when the Diaspora was for all intents and purposes ambushed by them without prior consultation, there is now mounting concern that Armenia would again be pressured to give up the occupied territories (which it should do eventually anyway) in exchange for mere promises of security (which it should certainly not accept on its own minus any concrete return). Yet, this breakthrough looks rather premature to me, more so in view of the increased frequency in armed skirmishes between both sides. However, once the negotiations - and concomitant pressures - become more critical over self-determination, or about an Armenian pullout or even over the corridor linking Armenia to Nagorny-Karabagh, I hope the Armenian politicians and their mandarins will be more prudent when they discuss the final outcome than what they did with the two protocols signed in Zürich last week.
But let me add a couple of correctives here. Many people today are claiming that this agreement dealt a fatal blow to the issue of recognition of the Armenian Genocide, and that countries from the USA to Israel will no longer have to recognise it since the Armenia government will be “implementing an impartial and scientific examination” over its historical veracity. Much as there is a modicum of truth in this postulation, I would nonetheless add that the issue of recognition will not die away since it remains a Diasporan priority that voters in the USA and elsewhere will continue to lobby for and perhaps even at a higher pitch - irrespective of any political protocols between Turkey and Armenia. So I would suggest that President Obama has not been let off the hook, as Armenian-American voters and their supporters will ensure that their demands remain audible. But as a lawyer, let me play the devil’s advocate and refer to an idea I was discussing earlier with the Armenian-British author George Jerjian. Is it remotely possible that this provision in the protocol is solely a smokescreen to help Turkey save face before “accepting” the recommendations of the said commission that genocide occurred in fact? Or is this too wild a theory even by Machiavellian standards?
In the final analysis, one regrettable collateral damage from those protocols is that scores of ordinary Armenian men and women worldwide who have been hardy supporters of normalisation with Turkey are now being labelled extremists, loudmouths or nationalists simply because they seek an agreement that is credible, equitable, mutually-beneficial and sustainable rather than one that is based on indignity, injustice, disequilibrium and non-sustainability. No amount of football matches in Yerevan (present capital of Armenia) or Bursa (former capital of the Ottoman Empire) could erase from the minds of countless peoples that this agreement lacks adequate moral as much as political probity and that its far-reaching and long-term ramifications are as unsettling as they are unclear.
But how will we Armenians be spared the disturbing fallout of those protocols when there is so much disappointment and some anger, and how will we also ensure that the yawning gap between the Armenian Republic and the Armenian Diaspora does not ricochet dangerously beyond control and arrest our collective future hopes? Will we manage to bridge any of the divides through public diplomacy and people-to-people contacts to ensure real reconciliation?
Therein lies in my opinion the next existential challenge that confronts us all, one that goes even beyond Mount Ararat and genocide, and it should have perhaps been the real question from the BBC presenter to me last Sunday.
© hbv-H @ 15 October 2009
Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-
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