Vahagn Chakhalyan - traduccion automatica

30 de octubre 2009
COMUNICADO DE PRENSA

La Unión Europea está siguiendo el juicio de la activista política Javakheti Vahagn Chakhalyan.

El Comisionado de la Unión Europea de Relaciones Exteriores, Benita Ferrero-Waldner responde a los miembros del Parlamento Europeo Sylvie Guillaume

Yerevan,28 de octubre 2009

El 15 de septiembre el diputado del Parlamento Europeo, Sylvie Guillaume escribió al Comisario Europeo de Relaciones Exteriores, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, para pedirle que llamar la atención de las estructuras pertinentes de la UE para el caso de la activista política Javakheti Vahagn Chakhalyan

l 7 de octubre Mme. Ferrero-Waldner, respondió a esta carta, indicando que la Unión Europea está siguiendo todos los acontecimientos en el juicio de Chakhalyan a través de su Delegación en Georgia.

A continuación se muestra la traducción completa de la carta de respuesta al Inglés, hecha por "Yerkir" de la Unión.

Mme Sylvie GuillaumeBruselas, 7 de octubre 2009

Señora,Gracias por su carta de fecha 15 de septiembre de 2009, sobre la situación de las minorías nacionales en Georgia. Les aseguro que se le dio la máxima atención.

Como usted sabe, la UE y Georgia, como parte de la política de vecindad, han acordado una serie de objetivos ambiciosos. Estos objetivos se traducen en compromisos específicos contraídos por Georgia en el Plan de Acción, incluido el funcionamiento de las instituciones democráticas, el Estado de Derecho y el respeto de los derechos humanos.

El documento también contiene disposiciones sobre las minorías. Los compromisos asumidos por Georgia en este campo incluyen los derechos de las minorías étnicas y su seguridad, el respeto de los derechos de propiedad y la firma y ratificación de la Carta Europea de Lenguas Regionales o Minoritarias. Todas estas cuestiones se debatirán en el diálogo político regular con Georgia y están sujetas a revisión periódica, en el informe que publicamos cada año para cada país participante en la Unión Política Europea de Vecindad.

Además, el reciente fortalecimiento de la Asociación Oriental, tanto en sus dimensiones multilaterales y bilaterales, le dará mayor importancia al diálogo político con Georgia. Aprovechamos cada oportunidad para recordar a las autoridades de Georgia acerca de la estrecha relación entre esta y la necesidad de seguir avanzando en el pluralismo político, la democracia y el respeto de las minorías. Por otra parte, el nivel de aspiración en las relaciones con la Unión Europea dependerá de la inclusión de estos valores en las políticas y acciones emprendidas por Georgia.

Por favor, tenga también en cuenta que más asistencia financiera sustancial concedida a Georgia para el periodo 2008-2010 fue acompañado de renovados compromisos, llevada a cabo por el Gobierno georgiano en la democracia, el Estado de Derecho y la independencia del poder judicial. Nos tomamos muy en serio estas cuestiones.

Sobre el Sistema de Justicia, debo decirles que me conceden la máxima importancia para el proyecto de apoyo a las reformas en el campo, que nos ayuden financieramente. Su objetivo es hacer la justicia más transparente, incluida la aplicación de las reformas del sistema de justicia penal del Estado y el fortalecimiento de la Oficina del Defensor Público.

En cuanto al juicio en curso del Sr. Chakhalyan que usted ha mencionado, me complace informarle de que seguimos todos los desarrollos a través del cuidadoso trabajo de nuestra delegación en Tbilisi. Se sigue este proceso con rapidez, en estrecha colaboración con la Presidencia y los Estados miembros sobre el terreno.

Le ruego acepte el testimonio de mi mas alta consideracion
Benita ferrero-Waldner

"Yerkir" Union de las Organizaciones no Gubernamentales para la repatriación y el asentamiento. www.yerkir.org

Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-

Nombres de lugares en el republicano turquia - traductor automatico

29 de octubre 2009
Ruben Malkonyan
TURKISHIZING DE LOS NOMBRES DEL LUGAR EN EL REPUBLICANO TURQUÍA

Si bien el análisis de algunas manifestaciones de la política interna de la República de Turquía, podemos mencionar que son en su mayoría de carácter Turkishizing. Hubo varios procesos en curso en el recién formado Turquía, que estaban dirigidos a formar el Estado turco homogéneo. Este proceso, inevitablemente, debe tocar en los nombres de lugar, porque en la Turquía otomana hubo muchos lugares mencionados en las lenguas de las naciones indígenas, que son directamente demostrar su presencia. Los nombres de lugar, al mismo tiempo, mostrar el pasado histórico, la historia de la gente que vivía allí, algunos detalles de su mentalidad. Esa es la razón por la función muy importante fue adjudicada a la Turkishizing de los nombres de lugar en la República de Turquía.
El proceso de Turkishizing de los nombres de lugar, al igual que la política de Tukishizing en general, no era un fenómeno nuevo y se había iniciado mucho tiempo antes. Pero esta política adquirió más relieve y sistematizado de caracteres en la mitad del siglo 19 y se profundizan aún más durante el gobierno de los Jóvenes Turcos.
En la Turquía kemalista las propuestas de cambiar los nombres de lugar se hicieron tan tarde como a principios de 1920. En 1922, algunos nombres de lugares de Armenia, que ya habían sido distorsionadas, se han renombrado. En particular, Moks histórico, que se transformó en Mokyus, que hoy se llama Bahcesaray. En 1928, los nombres de lugares griego en la Sede del mar Egeo y los nombres de lugares de Armenia en las regiones meridionales y orientales, se cambió el nombre y Turkishized. Pero el proceso de escala más grande del cambio de nombre se inició en 1940 cuando el Ministerio del Interior de Turquía, los problemas de la Circular n ° 8589, donde la necesidad de cambiar "los nombres de los centros de población y los nombres de lugar, que descienden de las lenguas extranjeras y las raíces y que provocan malentendidos durante su utilización "con los nombres de Turquía se ha mencionado con claridad. Después de que la administración de las provincias preparado y enviado al Ministerio las listas de los "extranjeros" los nombres de lugares. El período durante el cual se llevó a cabo este proceso, también es notable - 1940, cuando a gran escala Turkishizing procesos fueron sucediendo en Turquía (por ejemplo, en economía), cuando hubo diferentes manifestaciones de la discriminación de la población no musulmana.
Las obras concretas sobre Turkishizing de los topónimos se inició en 1957 cuando se creó la Comisión "especializados para el cambio de nombre de los topónimos". Se fueron los representantes del Estado Mayor General, los Ministerios de Interior, Defensa, y Educación, la Facultad de Lingüística y geo-históricos y profesores "de Turquía Asociación de Lingüística". Hay otro matiz notable aquí, es decir, aunque las autoridades de Turquía ha cambiado, no tenía ninguna influencia en la política de Turkishizing. La comisión mencionada había trabajado hasta 1978 y durante ese período sobre los nombres de 75 mil lugar se estudiaron y 28 mil fueron renombrados. El investigador turco, profesor asociado de la Universidad de Eprat Harun Tunchel afirma que se han renombrado 12 mil aldeas, que constituyen aproximadamente el 35% de todos los pueblos de Turquía,. Tunchel también ha preparado la lista de los pueblos de nombre y de su distribución cuantitativa provincia, que se presenta abajo:

Nombre de la Provincia
Número de los pueblos
Adana
169
Izmir
68
Adiyaman
224
Kars
398
Afion
88
Kastamonu
295
Aghri
374
Kesaria
86
Amasia
99
Kiriklareli
35
Ankara
193
Kirshehir
39
Antalia
168
Kocaeli
26
Ardvin
101
Konia
236
Aydin
69
Kyutahya
93
Balikesir
110
Malatia
217
Bilecik
32
Manisa
83
Bingol(Tchpakhdjur)
247
Marash
105
Bitlis
236
Mardin
647
Bolu
182
Mugla
70
Burdur
49
Mush
297
Bursa
136
Nevshehir
24
Chanakkale
53
Nigde
48
Chankiri
76
Ordu
134
Chorum
103
Rize
105
Denizli
53
Sakaria
117
Diarbekir
555
Samsun
185
Edirne
20
Siirt (Sghert)
392
Elyagiz(Kharberd)
383
Sinop
59
Erzincan(Erznka)
366
Sebastia
406
Erzurum
653
Tekirdagh
19
Eskishehir
70
Tokat(Evdokia)
245
Gaziantep
279
Trabzon
390
Giresun
167
Tunceli(Dersim)
273
Gumushhane
343
Urfa
389
Hakkari
128
Ushak
47
Hatay
117
Van
415
Esparta
46
Yozghat
90
ICHEL
112
Zonguldak
156
Estambul
21

Total
12211

Resulta claro de esta lista que la mayoría de los nombres de los lugares fueron renombrados en el este, sudeste y zonas del Mar Negro, es decir, principalmente en la Armenia histórica, así como en los territorios griegos. Por estimación Tonchel, la Comisión ha prestado especial atención a los nombres de lugar que las partes constituyentes fueron las palabras tales como morrón rojo,, la iglesia, que muestren claramente su no-turco o no origen musulmán y el rojo la palabra también tenía algo de sombra comunista. Por cierto, el lugar de nacimiento del Primer Ministro turco Erbogan es Guneysu distrito de la provincia de Rize, que hasta ahora se llama entre las personas, obviamente no-turco nombre Potomia.
En la actualidad, el proceso de cambio de nombre de nombres de lugares se trata en Turquía y no de manera activa y los representantes de los principales dirigentes del país que participan en los debates, intentando, por supuesto, para introducir en sus estimaciones que el proceso político y los intereses. Así, muy recientemente, el presidente de Turquía Gul durante su visita a la parte oriental del país, declaró en una de las reuniones que el nombre real de la zona que hoy se llama Guroymak es Norashen. El primer ministro Erdogan, mantuvo el ritmo con el que él decía que era una palabra Manazkert armenio. Todos estos se convirtieron en un problema de política interior y permitieron que la oposición la culpa las autoridades. El partido Movimiento Nacionalista es, como siempre, más activo en esta cuestión. El argumento distantes estalló entre su líder Devlet Bahcheli y el primer ministro Erdogan. En particular, Devlet Bahcheli, culpando a las autoridades, ironizó, diciendo que tal vez puede cambiar el nombre de Estambul y lo llaman Constantinopla.
Cabe mencionar que Estambul, donde se hizo hincapié en el cambio de nombre de las calles con nombres extranjeros, tampoco evitar ese proceso. El Turkishizing de los nombres de las calles de Estambul comenzó en 1927 y su principal objetivo fue el barrio armenio y griego. Hay que decir que algunas tendencias en el cambio de nombre de las calles y los cuartos son evidentes, especialmente en los distritos donde la población armenia y griega domina, nombres de lugares nacionalistas o los nombres de lugares que contienen la llamada "amenaza simbólica" prevalecerá. Aquí nos gustaría traer ejemplo más vívido. Un armenio de Estambul, nos dijo: "Yo vivo en Kurtulush Mi casa está en Ergenekon trimestre, en Turkbey Street, y con el fin de la votación me voy a la escuela después de Taleat Pachá ". Según las investigaciones llevadas a cabo hoy, antes de 1954 los nombres de más de 100 calles y barrios se habían Turkishized en Estambul.
Cabe mencionar que a pesar de los esfuerzos realizados por el Estado turco, algunos nombres de lugares de Armenia se siguen utilizando hasta hoy, aunque en forma distorsionada. Por ejemplo, el pueblo de Tsronq en Mush (rebautizado Krkoy) es llamado por los lugareños Sronq, Hatsekats se llama Hasik, y hay muchos ejemplos de este tipo. Esto demuestra que la gente común no han adquirido nuevos topónimos, y al mismo tiempo, hay los elementos de la memoria histórica en el uso continuo de los topónimos de Armenia.

Otros temas de autor
SOBRE LA MANIFESTACIÓN DE ARMENIA DESCENSO EN TURQUÍA [27.04.2009]
DE ORIENTACIÓN DE ARMENIA Ergenekon [31.03.2009]
Problema del origen étnico en la agenda política EN TURQUÍA [05.03.2009]
SOBRE percepción mutua de armenios en Turquía [09.02.2009]
SOBRE MANIFESTAIONS de identidad en Turquía [22.01.2009]
TURCO "Estado Nación" condiciones previas [04.12.2008]
Especulaciones sobre el PROBLEMA de los armenios de CRYPTO [01.07.2008

Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-

VAHAGN CHAKHALYAN

Déclaration de Vahagn Chakhalyan, politique du líder Djavakhk, refus hijo annonçant de participer aux audiencias de procès hijo en appel

De:
Unión YERKIR-Europa (contact@yerkir.eu)
Enviado por:
Domingo, 25 de octubre de 2009 07:37:27 p.m.
Para: orgwelcome@hotmail.com - Miguel Angel Nalpatian

contact@yerkir.eu
Versión en inglés, ruso y armenio adjunta

Le 16 octobre 2009, le leader de l'Alliance Démocratique Djavakhk Uni, Vahagn Chakhalyan, actuellement détenu à la prison de haute sécurité n ° 6 de la Ciudad de Roustavi (Géorgie), un avocat à la transmisión hijo une déclaration refus hijo annonçant de participer procès à son.


Déclaration de Vahagn refus hijo Chakhalyan sur de participer aux audiencias de procès hijo en appel.

Le 22 juillet 2009, procès lun s'ouvrait, ainsi que celui de mon père, Rubén et de mon frère cadete Armen, devant la Cour d'appel de Tiflis.

A la fecha d'aujourd'hui, les deux audiencias de la Cour d'appel démontrent que les procédures continuent avec les mêmes violaciónes celles que commises procès lun Durant en première instance:

- Les procédures judiciaires ont eu lieu sans avocat français mon, Patrick Arapian. Les autorités ayant gorgiennes denegar, illégalement, de lui donner une homologación de plaider es Georgie;

- Le juge de la Cour d'appel una rejeté pratiquement toutes les Requêtes de mes abogados Raisons pour des inacceptables;

- La traduction, en Arménien, el público des inadaptée est totalement et incomprensible.

Par conséquent, je n'ai pas la possibilité de suivre correctement le cours du procès, ainsi que d'y participer. Le déroulement de ce procès va à l'encontre des droits de la défense prévue par les lois gorgiennes et internationales.

Dans ces circonstances, la participación ma à cette procédure judiciaire reviendrait à légitimer, contre ma volonté, honteuse farsa cette qui se déroule dans ce tribunal. Rechazar donc je de participer, de mon plein gré, à ce procès.

Vahagn Chakhalyan
16 octobre 2009

Si vous désirez de plus amples renseignements, contactez l'avocat de Vahagn Chakhalyan, Stepan Voskanyan, au (+374) 91 38 37 30.

Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-

Detras de las escenas del conflicto de Karabaj - traduccin automatica

Detrás de las escenas del conflicto de Karabaj ...
Cenk Started

actualizada sobre el tiempo de 3/9/2009

milliyet.com.tr

Acercamiento turco-armenio en el proceso de los problemas más básicos de Karabaj se menciona es que los armenios de Karabaj ciertamente no se quiere conectar de nuevo a Azerbaiyán. Bakú, en el enfoque Karabaj ciertamente no le da la independencia, sin embargo, en los últimos tiempos entre la solución, de acuerdo a los armenios de Karabaj de Azerbaiyán en la ciudad cerca de todos los de la mayor parte o de retirada de Karabaj y Armenia se conectará con un corredor, la cuestión del estatuto político que se deja a la vez
Armenia, Azerbaiyán y luego arrastrados a la guerra, los estados grandes en el Cáucaso trajo cara y recientemente la frontera turco-armenia en el acercamiento al proceso más que el nombre mencionado-Karabaj, la Unión Soviética heredó el más difícil y complejo es uno de los problemas étnicos.Repartidos en un área de 4500 kilómetros cuadrados en el sur del nombre de la región del Cáucaso es también polémica. Azerbaiyanos de la región, turco, "negro" y persa "unión" para reunir a las palabras "Karabaj", dice, los armenios "bosque fuerte" en el sentido de "Artsah" se llama. Los rusos, por Karabaj "montaña", que significa "Nagornıy" Yo añade. A lo largo de la historia, Turquía, Irán y Rusia se mantuvo bajo la influencia, la participación en el 1800s temprano, el Imperio Ruso en Karabaj, los armenios, azeríes son también reclamados. El Kremlin tras la revolución de 1917, los ciudadanos de diferentes orígenes étnicos "divide y vencerás" táctica y comenzó a administrar el resultado de esta política dio Karabaj a Azerbaiyán.Divide y vencerás!La Unión Soviética, Rusia, Kazajstán, Ucrania, Azerbaiyán, Armenia y Lituania, la República constaba de un total de 15, por ejemplo. Esta es también diferente en su república propia, donde las personas pertenecientes a minorías étnicas viven las repúblicas autónomas, que estaban separadas o regiones. En todas partes, creando una tensión potencial, por lo que el Kremlin, el centro de la oposición masiva contra la posible antes del comienzo se ha suprimido, y se utiliza un grupo étnico contra otro.Como bomba de tiempoEsta política funcionó durante 74 años de poder soviético. Los rusos de Moldavia, Osetia del İnguşlarla, los turcos mesjetios y uzbecos de vez en cuando los conflictos se han sucedido entre. Territorio de Azerbaiyán, más de tres cuartas partes de la población de los armenios de Nagorno-Karabaj, región autónoma de Azerbaiyán, que consiste en el corazón de la creación significaba poner una bomba de tiempo. Del mismo modo, en Armenia y Azerbaiyán no tienen ninguna conexión por tierra, se fundó la mayoría de los azeríes en la Región Autónoma de Najicheván.Explotó en 1988La mayoría de la población de Karabaj, 180 mil personas componen la vida de los armenios de Azerbaiyán causados debido a la tensión, el proceso de reforma política del líder soviético Mikhail Gorbachev lanzó que aflojó las cuerdas en 1988 y llegó a ser explosivo. Con el consejo local votó a favor de los armenios de Karabaj con Armenia tomó la decisión de fusionarse. Decisión ha creado un efecto de terremoto. Entre armenios y azeríes se inició la difusión del conflicto, con los azeríes en Nagorno-armenios que viven en Azerbaiyán huido de sus hogares por temor y el pánico se había hecho. La desintegración de la Unión Soviética oficialmente creado el caos en los armenios de Karabaj de Azerbaiyán en 1991, "oficialmente", declaró la independencia.Presidente de Azerbaiyán Ebülfeyz Elchibey, junio de 1992, que gana la elección no tendrá la Azeri-ejército-Karabaj y la otra mitad se hizo cargo de conquista de la región. Sin embargo, el ejército armenio, con el apoyo de los armenios de Karabaj tomó estas tierras de nuevo. En ese momento, ampliamente debatido en Azerbaiyán esta derrota intentando hacer las caídas de los círculos gobernantes de Elchibey de la reclamación que se ha planteado. Sobre todo el ministro de Defensa Rahim período Gaziyev fueron acusados. En 1993, apoyada por Moscú azerí presuntos rebeldes contra el coronel Copia Hüseyinov'un Elchibey iniciado durante el intento de golpe de Estado que apoya la retirada de la fachada de la unidad, los armenios de Karabaj, en la frontera a través de un lote de terreno sin luchar, casi nunca conquistadas.40 mil personas murieronArmenios Karabaj "rebelión en el proceso antes de la ayuda confidencial Soviética, el ejército de Rusia ha obtenido también se habla mucho. Como resultado, 40 mil personas murieron en el conflicto y después de la masacre, Baku, Karabaj y en torno al conjunto de las siete regiones (Kelbajar, Lachin, Kubat con Gabriel, Zengilan, Akdam y Fuzuli), que constituyen más del 20 por ciento del territorio perdido. Más de un millón de azeríes, el "fugitivo", que "los inmigrantes" con el estado cayó.En 1994, el acuerdo de paz de Nagorno fue firmado arabuluculuğunda Rusia Bishkek. En 1997, el presidente de Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosian de la época, un movimiento dirigido a resolver el problema de Karabaj. Sin embargo, la cabeza de Robert Kocharyan es eficaz para atraer-Karabaj de que la política de Armenia y de los políticos de origen, derrocó al ex comandante de inmediato.La independencia no conocía a nadieEn 2006 fue declarada la soberanía en un referéndum celebrado en Karabaj. La independencia de Karabaj hasta ahora no reconocida por ningún país, incluida Armenia.Organización para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa (OSCE), del Grupo de Minsk es debido, sus esfuerzos por resolver el conflicto de Karabaj, hasta mediados del año pasado fracasó. Después de la guerra ruso-georgiana, el punto de vista cambiantes de la región del Cáucaso en Moscú, tratando de mantener en el estante durante años para resolver la cuestión de Turquía con el apoyo de las iniciativas que comenzaron. El problema está bloqueado punto: volver a los armenios Karabaj a Azerbaiyán, definitivamente no se quiere conectar. La independencia de Karabaj a Bakú para dar absolutamente no se acercó.Un trabajo en el orden del díaSin embargo, últimamente muy discutido y se cree que tienen posibilidades de aplicación de la solución de acuerdo a la búsqueda, los armenios de Karabaj de alrededor de la totalidad o gran parte de la ciudad azerí de retirarse. Karabaj y Armenia se conectará con un corredor, el tiempo restante para la cuestión del status político. Petróleo y gas natural que se enriquece con Azerbaiyán, los armenios de Karabaj después de 15-20 años a raíz de las inversiones a realizar por cambiar las ideas sobre el papel, incluso si se puede re-up cuentas están conectados a Bakú. Armenia es la gestión, por resolver el problema de Karabaj, hasta ahora excluidos, como parte de la región para elevar el nivel de desarrollo y quiere venir en parte de la órbita de Rusia.

Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-

Remember to Forget

Remember to Forget

By Ofri Ilani , Haaretz.com, 16 October 2009

On a hill overlooking the Armenian capital Yerevan, a monument commemorates the murder of the Armenian people. Since the country gained independence in 1990, visiting foreign leaders are expected to stop at the monument and plant a tree in a small grove dedicated to the victims.
The first row of trees has plaques from Vladimir Putin, Jacques Chirac, Pope John Paul II and a few Eastern European leaders. There are none from Israeli or American leaders. In fact, so few leaders have agreed to recognize the genocide that starting in the second row, the site's patrons have had to make do with top officials from various organizations. One tree was planted by the chairman of the European dentists association, another by the president of the international weight lifting federation.
While denial of the European Jewish Holocaust produces international condemnations, many countries have a policy of not recognizing the Armenian genocide, which was perpetrated by the Turks. This is due not to a lack of documentation about the massacres, but to massive Turkish political pressure. Armenia, for its part, has waged a persistent - and in some cases successful - struggle demanding the rectification of this ongoing historic wrong.
This week saw a dramatic development in the long and bitter conflict between Turkey and Armenia. The two countries signed an agreement to open their border and establish normal diplomatic relations. The genocide is not mentioned anywhere in the historic accord.
"I am afraid that now countries will hesitate to recognize the genocide," says Prof. Yair Oron, a genocide expert from the Open University of Israel who has published several books about the Armenian genocide. "They will say: Why should we grant recognition if the Armenians yielded? Recognition of the Armenian genocide is a paramount moral and educational act. We in Israel are obliged to recognize it. I see this as a serious blow to those who are fighting for its recognition."
If the agreement is ratified by the parliaments of the two countries, it could prove highly beneficial for Armenia. The small country in the Caucasus is isolated politically and lacks access to the sea. Its economy is in a shambles, and its government is corrupt. After the departure of some one million citizens over the past two decades, the country has a population of only three million. In the absence of regional allies, Armenia is compelled to rely on neighboring Iran for support.
Economically and politically, then, the agreement with Turkey, which will give Armenia access to the sea, looks like a good deal for the tiny republic. Like the Israelis, the Armenians also want to vacation in Antalya, politics be damned. But in return for the border being opened, Armenia completely dropped its demands regarding the property of genocide victims and Armenian lands in much of present-day eastern Turkey.
Moreover, Armenia has effectively dropped its demand for recognition of the genocide itself, the cornerstone of Armenian national identity. Yerevan had to accept the demand Turkey has been making for years: for an "objective historical examination" about whether the genocide took place.
This first significant peace agreement signed under the auspices of U.S. President Barack Obama raises questions of principle: Does a country have the right to forgo its past for the sake of present needs? Can a political agreement lay down an official version of history? Is the establishment of a commission the way to come to terms with memory?
Starting at the end of the 19th century, the Armenian minority living in the Ottoman Empire was subject to persecution. Tens of thousands were killed. The event known as the "Armenian genocide" involved the systematic destruction of communities between 1915 and 1918. The massacre of the Armenians began after Ottoman forces lost several battles against czarist Russia. Armenian soldiers living under the czar had distinguished themselves in battle on the Russian side, and this became the pretext for the massacre of the Armenians living in what is now Turkey.
Following lengthy deliberations, the Ottoman government decided to resolve once and for all the "Armenian problem." First, the Turks drafted about a quarter of a million young Armenians into the army. They were then stripped of their uniforms, concentrated in labor battalions and murdered. On the night between April 23 and 24, 1915, Istanbul police arrested hundreds of Armenian leaders and intellectuals in their homes; 235 were executed. Thus the Armenian leadership was destroyed, leaving the community unable to organize.
At this stage, the Armenians living in the eastern regions of the Ottoman Empire began to be evacuated by a "special organization" of criminals and prisoners created for that purpose. People were rounded up in their villages and cities. The men were usually shot on the spot, while the women, children and elderly were sent on forced marches into the Syrian desert. On the way, they were attacked and robbed by Kurdish gangs. Hundreds of thousands marched to their death. In October 1915, the U.S. consul general in Aleppo reported to his government on one such march of 18,000 people; 70 days later, only 35 were still alive.
Governments received reports about the genocide while it was in progress, but most did nothing. Current estimates state that about a third of all Armenians, 1.2 million to 1.5 million, were annihilated. The Turks claim only 300,000 were killed, in what they call a defensive move against a fifth column that had joined the country's enemies. They say that no decision was ever made to wipe out the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.
"The Turks say: There was a war, there were battles and Armenians were killed, but so were Turks," says Oron. "It's true that the Turks did not espouse a racial doctrine like that of the Nazis, who set out to annihilate every Jew everywhere. And it is also important to say that there were cases in which Turks saved Armenians. But there was a policy of annihilating the Armenians and taking their property."
"Would the Jewish people be willing to forgo the memory of the Holocaust for the sake of good relations with Germany, if Germany were to make that demand?" asks Prof. Richard Hovannisian, a historian who has devoted the past 40 years to fighting denial of the Armenian genocide. The American-born Hovannisian, who teaches at UCLA, is the son of Armenian exiles from eastern Turkey. The family came from a village that was emptied by the Turks. Hovannisian has published many books on the genocide and is considered one of the world's leading authorities on the subject.
"The present agreement is the result of the fact that all the great powers wanted only for everyone to be good happy neighbors, irrespective of the price entailed," says Hovannisian, speaking by phone from California. "They want to do away with all the problems, but are not taking into account the victims' different perspectives."
Criticism from the diaspora
About two-thirds of Armenians live outside Armenia, mainly in Russia, the United States, France and the Middle East. Over the years complex relations have developed between Armenia, the small Caucasian state that was established after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Armenian diaspora. The Armenians living in the West send money to their homeland but can also be fiercely critical of it.
"I was disappointed. I expected the Armenian side to be more skillful in the negotiations," Hovannisian says. "It is clear that the government was under a great deal of pressure. Armenia is a small, isolated country. They are under siege, and it is only natural that they should want to be part of the world around them. But I think the government did not have the right to sign any agreement that accepts the present situation, which is the result of the genocide, as the normal state of affairs. The Armenian nation's present situation is the result of the Turkish expulsion and seizure of Armenian land. Even if we do not have the power to change this, I do not think we should recognize it. We have a moral obligation not to recognize it."
George Hintlian, former head of the Armenian community in Jerusalem, has a sharper response: "We in the Armenian diaspora are shocked. It is like an earthquake. It is the bankruptcy of international morality. They say there is reconciliation, but there is no recognition here by Turkey. It is a coerced agreement, which the world's powers forced on Armenia. Russia, which traditionally supported Armenia, is now drawing close to Turkey."
What is especially regrettable in this context, Hintlian says, is that in recent years recognition of the Armenian genocide has increased.
"Now they are placing the holocaust in doubt and saying, we will discuss it and see if it happened. It is impossible to know what the findings will be, what kind of formula they will reach. It is unlikely that the Turks will recognize the holocaust. The commission does not have a timetable, and in the meantime, after this commission is established, no country will take a stand on the Armenian genocide. Present-day Armenia is one-tenth the size of historic Armenia, and it has signed for its final borders without getting anything in return. "
Hintlian believes that the agreement's shortcomings far outweigh its advantages.
"The practical gain is the opening of the border and the lifting of the embargo," he says. "There was a physical embargo on Armenia, and now there is an embargo on the holocaust. The facts will not be buried, but the international discussion will suffer a blow."

Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-

Concerning Nagorno - Karabakn

PUBLICATIONS IN AMERICAN PERIODICALS CONCERNING NAGORNO-KARABAKH IN 1918-20 Haykaram Nahapetyan

On March 29 of this year on Azerbaijani day.az portal the publication appeared, according to which in the archive of “New York Times” the article was found where Karabakh and Zangezur were mentioned as parts of Mousavatist Azerbaijan (http://day.az/news/politics/151388.html). As Artsakh neither in the mentioned years nor ever has been a part of Azerbaijan (including the fact that the independent Azerbaijan had never existed before May 28, 1918) it remains to find out the backgrounds of another disinformation. It is worth mentioning what “New York Times” and other authoritative American media wrote about Nagorno-Karabakh during the short period of independence of the South Caucasus republics. Thus, day.az cites the “New York Times” publication of August 4, 1920 in which it is mentioned that “Karabakh and Zangezur populated by the Armenians were cut off the rest of the Republic of Armenia and were not controlled by the Armenian authorities due to the absence of the roads and communications”1. Azerbaijani propaganda machine qualified this information no less than “a historical proof that those territories belonged to the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan” though the word “Azerbaijan” is not even mentioned in that media report. The fact that the Azerbaijani propaganda machine failed to find in the American archives any publication where Artsakh is clearly mentioned as a part of Azerbaijan is rather conspicuous. The most the Azerbaijani propagandists could find and slant to their false thesis was the aforementioned publication. And what did the American press publish about Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918-20 in reality?
In the “Chicago Daily Tribune” issue of July 31, 1919 we can read the telegram of the American army officer Major Joseph Green who was working in Tiflis to the Director General of «Neat East Relief» humanitarian organization Herbert Hoover who was in Paris at that time at the Peace conference. Later, in 1929-1933 Hoover became the 31st president of the USA.
“The Turkish army well prepared and Tartars are advancing from 3 sides…They have cut off the Armenian relief supplies and threaten all the remaining Armenians with the extradition”. According to daily, “Herbert Hoover, the Director-general of the relief, immediately submitted Maj Green’s message to the peace conference, which already had similar reports from other American or British observers”. “The disaster will be more terrible than the massacres in 1915 and the Armenian nation will be crushed, to the everlasting shame of allies…General mobilization was ordered yesterday…We shall no be able to carry on relief work much longer unless British troops receive orders to clear all Russian Armenia, including Karabagh and Alaghez, of Turkish and Tartar forces”2, - wrote Major Green
In the issue of “Atlanta Constitution” of the same date we read: ““The Turks and Tartars are advancing in the districts of Karabagh and Alaghez. They now occupy approximately the territory of Russian Armenia. General mobilization was ordered yesterday”3.
Naturally, the “Tatars” and not “Azerbaijanis” ethnicon is used in the publication of the American press. The latter was put into circulation only at the end of 1936 on Stalin’s initiative. Even more in those two particular publications the unauthentic “Tartar” variant was used. In 1918-20s in the American press the ehtnicon “Tartar” was used instead of “Tatar”.
In “Christian Science Monitor” periodical of August 5, 1919 it is mentioned: “Karabagh is inhabited exclusively by Armenians, and was formerly practically independent and self-governing”4. The citation from the same newspaper of August 28: “The cause of the trouble is said to be apparently political, due to the desire of Tartars to annex the Armenian province of Karabagh to the Tartar Republic of Azerbaijan. The information from Paris gives the following details: “it was on June 4 at 3 o’clock in the morning, that the Armed forces of the Tartar government of Azerbaijan directed by Dr Soultanoff, who had been imposed by force as governor of Armenian Karabagh, began the attack upon the city of Chouci, the capital of Karabagh”5.
In the issue of the newspaper of September 2 we can read: “Some weeks ago, it will be remembered, Major Green who is directing the work of the American Relief association at Tiflis, dispatched message to Mr. Hoover – describing how the Turks and the Tartars were advancing on the Armenian district of Karabagh. Already the most carefully organized massacres have been carried out at Chouci, the capital of Karabagh” 6.
Just in a year when the 11th Red Army was in Caucasus American press informed of the aspiration of Moscow to establish Soviet order in Armenia. In “Bolsheviki advance into Armenia” publication in “Washington Post: 20.07.1920 ” it is mentioned:“The Armenian Government having refused to obey an ultimatum of the Russian Soviet Government, the Bolshevik army has received orders to advance and already has occupied province of Karabagh” 7. The Sovietization of Azerbaijan took place on April 28, 1920, meanwhile Russian army moved forward to Artsakh in July, and this is another puzzle for the Azerbaijani propagandists to present the lie that Karabakh was a part of Mousavatist Azerbaijan to their own and international communities. On July 26 “New York Times” develops the theme: “Considerable Russian Bolshevist forces, chiefly cavalry, are overrunning the Karabagh district of Armenia apparently with the purpose of joining the Turkish Nationalists”8. Here is the citation from “Atlanta Chronicles” of the same date: “Considerable Russian Bolshevik forces, chiefly cavalry, are overrunning the Karabagh district of Armenia … The Turkish Nationalists and the Bolsheviki approaching Shusha”9.
On August 2 “New York Times” wrote: “Bolshevist penetration of Armenia is continuing, according to late advices received here. The provinces of Karabagh and Zangezour, it is stated, established Soviet governments on July 20” 10.
And on March 16, 1921 when Armenia temporarily regained its independency “New York Times” wrote: “A radio telegram from Simon Vratian, President of the Armenian cabinet, dated March 7 at Erivan, announces that the Bolsheviki are completely beaten and that all the country from Karabagh to Alagheuz – that is to say, all the territory not occupied by the Turks – is now administrated by our government” 11.
Other examples can be brought. In the citations from more than a dozen of articles Nagorno-Karabakh is clearly defined as historically Armenian territory and a constituent part of Armenia from political point of view, and Baku is presented as the aggressor which aspired to annex Nagorno-Karabakh to the Tatar Azerbaijan. As we can see American officer Joseph Green saw the connection between the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the attempts to annihilate the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1919-1920. This is another fact which proves that at the end of the 20th century the Armenians of Artsakh fought exclusively for their self-defence and averted the threat of new genocide at the end of the 20th century. And the references to “New York Times” in its aspiration to present Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur as their historical territories is another manifestation of the Azerbaijani disinformation in which Baku, in fact, tries to profit from the name of the authoritative international media.

1Doubt Armenia is invaded, “New York Times”, 04.08.1920.
2Turks, Tatars peril Armenia, “Chicago Daily Tribune”, 31.07.1919.
3Turks move to Butcher Armenians, “The Atlanta Constitution”, 31.07.1919.
4Maasacre reported of 200 Armenians. “Christian Science Monitor”, 05.08.1919.
5Tartars and Kurds slay Armenians, “Christian Science Monitor”, 28.08.1919.
6Armenia again, “Christian Science Monitor”, 02.09.1919.
7Bolsheviki advance into Armenia. Will give aid to Turks, “The Washington Post” July 20, 1920.
8Bolsheviki marching to join Turks, “New York Times”, July 26, 1920.
9Bolshevik forces appear in Armenia, “The Atlanta constitution” 26.07.1920.
10Soviet invites Djemal pasha to lead Musulman reds, “New York Times”, August 2, 1920.
11Greeks said to plan new drive on Turks, “New York Times”, 16.03.1921

Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-

Do the protocols Bridge any Divides ???

Do the Protocols Bridge any Divides?The Turkey-Armenia Agreementdr harry hagopian

In a BBC radio interview on Sunday Sequence last week, I was asked for an assessment on the geopolitical as much as human impact of the recent agreement between Turkey and Armenia, and whether the signing of the two protocols will lead - at least on paper - to a normalisation of relations between these two unfriendly neighbours or at least open the common border that has been closed off unilaterally by Turkey since 1993.
What could I tell the programme presenter that I had not already incorporated into my Open Letter of 6th October to Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan? Were those issues not also adequately covered in the open letters, statements, analyses and opinions of many organisations and individuals alike? Had the Armenian National Committee of Canada, for instance, not dissected in five key points the two protocols and concluded that they were deeply flawed in nature? What about the writings of Raffi K Hovannisian and Vartan Oskanian, two seasoned politicians and former government ministers in Armenia? Had Hovannisian not asserted in his Protocols and Preconditions of 12th October that “in this millennial series of misfortunes”, the Armenian nation had never yet invited such destruction upon itself? Had Oskanian not also concluded on 14th October that “normalisation of Armenia-Turkey relations, as an idea even, has been discredited” and that it “has thus begun with the capitulation of the Armenian side”? But perhaps a most telling - and in its own right a most powerful - articulation was the short but incisive 8th October open letter to the Turkish and Armenian leaders by Professor William Schabas, an Irish-Canadian law professor, and president of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, who expressed the wariness of the IAGS “of any call for allegedly impartial research into what are clearly established historical facts” and added that “acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide must be the starting point of any ‘impartial historical commission’ and not one of its possible conclusions”.
In the final analysis, I believe this fragile agreement that was shrouded in mystery till the eleventh hour is more a marriage of convenience imposed upon two South Caucasian neighbours by outside matchmakers than a real desire for reconciliation between them. It is certainly not a case of Armenia and Turkey wishing to establish good - in the classical sense of co-equal - neighbourly relations, but rather one of geopolitical realities being dictated upon them. If the real purpose of the exercise were to reach reconciliation, then the truth should not have been shunned so maladroitly by both sides. Let me take just three examples to mark the distinction between expediency, reconciliation and truth in international relations. In the case of the Jewish Holocaust, which is genocide by another name, did Germany not recognise its heinous crimes and make good upon this chapter in its history during WWII? After all, it did not create a historical sub-commission to examine established facts, but rather recognised its crimes and made reparations for them. And if I were to look further at South Africa, with its Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1995, or perhaps even closer to home in Northern Ireland with the Good Friday / Belfast Agreement 1998, where erstwhile historical enemies worked together and admitted their mistakes, surely the paradox with the latest Turkey-Armenia agreement becomes even more self-evident in both its simplicity and duplicity. The simplicity is that the establishment of diplomatic relations between any two countries would require a mere - and familiar - template that is used universally and not two protocols with preconditions, commissions or omissions! The duplicity, on the other hand, is that such an agreement cannot be heralded as reconciliation when it brazenly obfuscates the truth and strays quite far from it. Indeed, by listening to President Sargsyan’s address last week when he placed the protocols in the context of Armenian rights and interests, not only did he fail to convince me with his arguments but in fact succeeded to underline why Armenia in the person of its foreign minister should not have signed the agreement as it stands today.
But the fact remains that those protocols have been signed in a rather self-conscious ceremony in Zürich that housed a smiling Turkish foreign minister, a less-than-smiling Armenian foreign minister, the clapping presence of the American, French and Russian foreign ministers as OSCE Minsk Group co-chair representatives, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Swiss host. Mind you, Turkey had every right to be smiling, as it avoided a last-minute glitch and deftly managed to pull off a political rabbit from its Ottoman fez. What now remains to be seen is whether the respective Turkish and Armenian parliaments will ratify this agreement in toto since they do not enjoy the right to amend or alter it, whether the border will eventually be opened so that Armenia acquires at long last an access to the sea, and whether the putative economic gains - a moot point for me actually - will filter down to the ordinary and needy people in Armenia. After all, I would suggest that an open border is at the very least as beneficial to Turkey as it is to Armenia since the former can trade in the Armenian market with cheap Turkish products, let alone invest in the country or even acquire Armenian national assets.But in the scroll of winners and losers from those two Turkey-Armenia protocols, it is almost a non-sequitur to argue that Turkey has largely neutralised Armenian efforts at lobbying for recognition of the genocide, found a market for its goods and also appeared to be a statesmanlike peace-builder which would earn it a few brownie points with the EU just in case its accession hopes are revalidated later. And while many people would also talk of the USA and the EU in terms of win-win or win-lose situations, what still surprises me is the eerie absence in the documents and commentaries coming out of politicians and pundits to date of the fact that the Russian Federation is another major benefactor of this agreement. This is why I would suggest that it will have exercised ample “friendly pressure” upon its ally Armenia to sign those two protocols. Following the Russian-Georgian war, and the new geopolitical shifts in the whole region, this agreement would not only facilitate its policies on oil and gas supplies and the route of its pipelines, it would also strengthen its influence in the region as well as wean oil-rich Azerbaijan just a tad away from Turkey and into its sphere of influence - as has been manifested by the successive visits to Baku by Russian political leaders.
Another crucial issue looming very much in the background of this agreement is the conflict in Nagorny-Karabagh. Again, as I wrote recently in my Open Letter, I remain quite convinced that Turkey will now use its “gains” from those protocols as a trump card to counter the “stalemate” in this conflict by coercing Armenia to settle with Azerbaijan. In fact, there is already some talk in the political corridors of the OSCE Minsk Group of a possible breakthrough between Armenia and Azerbaijan over a framework agreement on basic principles that was initially outlined in 2005. In fact, and in view of the surprise element of the two protocols when the Diaspora was for all intents and purposes ambushed by them without prior consultation, there is now mounting concern that Armenia would again be pressured to give up the occupied territories (which it should do eventually anyway) in exchange for mere promises of security (which it should certainly not accept on its own minus any concrete return). Yet, this breakthrough looks rather premature to me, more so in view of the increased frequency in armed skirmishes between both sides. However, once the negotiations - and concomitant pressures - become more critical over self-determination, or about an Armenian pullout or even over the corridor linking Armenia to Nagorny-Karabagh, I hope the Armenian politicians and their mandarins will be more prudent when they discuss the final outcome than what they did with the two protocols signed in Zürich last week.
But let me add a couple of correctives here. Many people today are claiming that this agreement dealt a fatal blow to the issue of recognition of the Armenian Genocide, and that countries from the USA to Israel will no longer have to recognise it since the Armenia government will be “implementing an impartial and scientific examination” over its historical veracity. Much as there is a modicum of truth in this postulation, I would nonetheless add that the issue of recognition will not die away since it remains a Diasporan priority that voters in the USA and elsewhere will continue to lobby for and perhaps even at a higher pitch - irrespective of any political protocols between Turkey and Armenia. So I would suggest that President Obama has not been let off the hook, as Armenian-American voters and their supporters will ensure that their demands remain audible. But as a lawyer, let me play the devil’s advocate and refer to an idea I was discussing earlier with the Armenian-British author George Jerjian. Is it remotely possible that this provision in the protocol is solely a smokescreen to help Turkey save face before “accepting” the recommendations of the said commission that genocide occurred in fact? Or is this too wild a theory even by Machiavellian standards?
In the final analysis, one regrettable collateral damage from those protocols is that scores of ordinary Armenian men and women worldwide who have been hardy supporters of normalisation with Turkey are now being labelled extremists, loudmouths or nationalists simply because they seek an agreement that is credible, equitable, mutually-beneficial and sustainable rather than one that is based on indignity, injustice, disequilibrium and non-sustainability. No amount of football matches in Yerevan (present capital of Armenia) or Bursa (former capital of the Ottoman Empire) could erase from the minds of countless peoples that this agreement lacks adequate moral as much as political probity and that its far-reaching and long-term ramifications are as unsettling as they are unclear.
But how will we Armenians be spared the disturbing fallout of those protocols when there is so much disappointment and some anger, and how will we also ensure that the yawning gap between the Armenian Republic and the Armenian Diaspora does not ricochet dangerously beyond control and arrest our collective future hopes? Will we manage to bridge any of the divides through public diplomacy and people-to-people contacts to ensure real reconciliation?
Therein lies in my opinion the next existential challenge that confronts us all, one that goes even beyond Mount Ararat and genocide, and it should have perhaps been the real question from the BBC presenter to me last Sunday.

© hbv-H @ 15 October 2009

Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-

ASALA - ARMENIAN SECRET ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA

THE POLITICAL PROGRAM:
AN OUTLINEARMENIAN SECRET ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA
The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) became known for the first time when it undertook its first military operation which was directed against an institution (The World Council of Churches) that serves the interests of international imperialism and its reactionary sponsors. This act and our declaration on its occasion demonstrated our understanding of the nature of our problem and the nature of our enemy and its supporters. It also shows our political line with relation to other struggles in the world. Our organization believes that it is impossible to overcome our problem, the struggle of the Armenian people, and the oppression of the proletariat unless we adopt revolutionary struggle. We are convinced that organized armed struggle is the principal means, and that it is impossible to achieve victory without the guidance of a revolutionary theory that defends the interests of the exploited classes from the enemy and its conspirators. At the same time the Armenian case will be brought to the surface of international events through our activities all over the world. The world today is witnessing the explosion of the revolution of oppressed nations and peoples who are achieving victory against imperialism, the expansion of the revolution of the proletariat against the capitalist mechanism, the gradual stability of socialist regimes as they widen their influence through progressive social and economic strides, and finally the intensifying crises for international imperialism. Our organization has as its enemy the Turkish regime which is a dependent of the reaction and imperialism and which represents a continuation of the previous regime whose reactionary chauvinistic ideology led to the occupation of our land and other oppressed peoples' lands leaving the defeated populations without their most basic national and human rights. Our organization is a part of the international revolutionary movement since our struggle against this enemy constitutes a part of the international revolution. The strengthening of relations between and coalitions among the peoples' movements and the revolutionary classes serves in widening the revolutionary front and in the coordination of blows to the exploitive and oppressive enemy. Every revolutionary movement has its unique conditions and experiences. For this reason mutual support and close relations among all international revolutionary movements will lead in the end to the success of the struggle through the sharing of the wisdom and experience of each revolutionary case. Every development in the opposition of the reaction is in the interests of liberty, independence, progress and socialism. The victory of any revolutionary movement in any part of the world is a victory for the universal revolution and a death blow to the exploitative and oppressive camp. Our organization has drafted its political line over a long period of preparation, organization, and a range of military operations directed against a number of Turkish ruling class interests which are connected to many international imperialist powers:1. The ASALA is a political organization that works through all means of struggle for the liberation of occupied Armenian territories from Turkish imperialism which is tied to local reactionary forces and sponsored by international imperialism.2. Our organization intends to realise the aspirations of the Armanian people who reject the authority of the oppressing classes coordinated by the chauvinist Turkish leadership.3. Our organization is directed by the axioms of scientific revolution.4. Without the exclusion of other means of struggle, our organization believes that revolutionary violence is the principal means and correct path in facing the exploitation, oppression and terror of Turkish colonialism.5. Our organization is a part of the international revolutionary movement, and as such we strive for the strengthening and expanding of coalitions within that movement because it is our conviction that the unity of revolutionaries throughout the world is a necessity for the victory of the exploited and oppressed masses.6. The liberation of occupied Armenian territories from Turkish fascist overlords will be followed by the unity of these territories with other Armenian territories which border them in the eventual creation of a democratic, socialist and-revolutionary system.7. The battlefield of our struggle is the diaspora of our people and any position where our enemies or its sponsors exist.8. We shall strive for the solidarity of the Soviet Union and socialist countries, and the recognition by them of the just character of our struggle, and their cooperation with our people in Soviet Armenia in the transformation of Soviet Armenia into a revolutionary base for the long people's war against Turkish colonialism, reactionary collaborators ands imperialism.
ARMENIAN SECRET ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA

Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-

Armenios en Turquia // Turcos Armenios ??

Armenios en Turquía
De Wikipedia, la enciclopedia libre

Los armenios en Turquía (en turco:Türkiye Ermenileri, en armenio:Estambul Ermenileri, el último de los cuales significa armenio de Estambul) tienen una población estimada que fluctúa entre 40.000 a 70.000 (1995).[1] [2] La mayoría está concentrada alrededor de Estambul, en Turquía y profesan la fe apostólica armenia. Los armenios financian sus propios periódicos y escuelas.

Historia
Artículo principal: Armenios en el Imperio Otomano
Los armenios que viven en Turquía son un remanente de una, alguna vez, gran comunidad al interior del Imperio Otomano. Durante el Imperio Otomano, fueron activos en campos como los negocios, así como los griegos y los judíos.[3] Los estimados referidos a la Población armenia otomana en la década previa a la Primera Guerra Mundial fluctúan en un rango entre 1,5 y 2,5 millones.
Para fines del siglo XIX, la pobreza y tensiones étnicas provocaron la emigración de unos 100.000 armenios a Europa y al continente americano. Entre 1894 y 1997, al menos 100.000 armenios fueron asesinados durante las masacres hamidianas. Posteriores masacres en 1909 causaron la muerte de un estimado de 20.000 a 30.000 armenios. Siguió el Genocidio armenio en 1915, durante el cual el gobierno otomano deportó a más de un millón y medio de armenios (cerca al 75% de toda la población armenia en el Imperio Otomano en 1915). Muchos murieron, mientras que alrededor de 300.000 fueron adoptados o se casaron con turcos y kurdos que conocieron en el camino.[4] [5] Muchos de los sobrevivientes terminaron en el norte de Siria y algunos regresaron a sus hogares en Turquía al final de la guerra.
Según la embajada armenia en Canadá,[6]
El genocidio, como hemos visto, destruyó el oeste de Armenia y varios otros centros armenios en Turquía. Para la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Constantinopla o Estambul fue el único centro urbano con una presencia armenia. En 1945, un impuesto predial arbitrario sobre las minorías empobreció a muchos hombres de negocios griegos y armenios. Diez años más tarde, las turbas saquearon y quemaron negocios griegos y armenios en Estambul. En la actualidad, hay unos 75.000 armenios en Turquía, la mayoría de los cuales viven en Estambul, donde las condiciones, a pesar de las presiones culturales y ocasionales actos hostiles, no son tan desfavorables como uno podría imaginar. Veinte escuelas, unos tres docenas de iglesias y un hospital mantienen una fuerte identidad armenia. Varios periódicos armenios, incluyendo el diario Marmara continúan siendo publicados y las organizaciones armenias se encargan de colectar donaciones y auspiciar actividades culturales. El patriarca armenio es también invitado a las ceremonias del estado turco. Los problemas más importantes incluyen la falta de un seminario, instituciones armenias de educación superior y asimilación lingüística.
En el periodo inmediato posterior a la guerra, las acciones militares llevadas a cabo por fuerzas nacionalistas turcas al sur de Turquía llevaron a la muerte de decenas de miles de armenios y cientos de miles de refugiados armenios. Las deportaciones masivas de los armenios sobrevivientes de Turquía continuaron a lo largo de la década de 1920, otros se fueron para huir de la pobreza o de la discriminación.

Población
Véase también: Demografía de Turquía
La cantidad de personas de origen armenio que viven actualmente en Turquía es mayor que el número oficial indicado, el mismo que comprende armenios como por la definición de una minoría cristiana (ekalliyet). Durante el Genocidio Armenio, muchos huérfanos armenios fueron adoptados por familias musulmanas locales, quienes algunas veces cambiaban sus nombres y los convertían al Islam. Una fuente cita 300.000,[4] pero otro análisis considera que esta cifra está sobredimensionada, inclinándose hacia unos 63.000, la figura citada en el Informe de 1921 del Patriarca Armenio de Constantinopla al Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos.[7]
Cuando los trabajadores de socorro y los armenios supervivientes empezaron a buscar y demandaban el retorno de estos huérfanos armenios tres la Primera Guerra Mundial, solo un pequeño porcentaje fue encontrado y vuelto a reunir, mientras que otros continuaron viviendo como musulmanes. Además, algunas familias armenias se habían convertido al Islam para escapar del genocidio. Debido a ello, en la actualidad, hay un número desconocido de personas de origen armenio en Turquía que no son conscientes de sus ancestros, así como alrededor de 100.000 armenios "clandestinos", denominados "cripto-cristianos".[8]
Según un artículo escrito por el columnista de Zaman, Erhan Başyurt, İbrahim Ethem Atnur de la Universidad de Atatürk alega que el Estado está coludido con el Patriarcado para incrementar artificialmente la población armenia al sumar huérfanos turcos como si fueran armenios.[9] En la década de 1960, algunas de estas familias se convirtieron de nuevo al Cristianismo y cambiaron sus nombres.

El periodista turco de origen armenio Hrant Dink sostuvo que la población actual de alrededor de 50.000 armenios es la mitad de la que fue hace ochenta años, como resultado de un intento deliberado de reducir a las minorías, durante el periodo de gobierno del Partido Único de la República de Turquía.[10]
Actualmente, entre 40.000[11] y 70.000[12] armenios originarios de Armenia trabajan en Turquía, muchas veces de manera ilegal.

Véase también
Hamshenis (en turco: Hemşinliler, en armenio: Համշենի) es un grupo étnico de la región del Mar Negro de Turquía. Son generalmente musulmanes suníes.

Hay dos grupos principales de Hamshenis:
El Baş Hemşin (grupo occidental) reside en las aldeas montañosas en la provincia de Rize, abundante en los distritos de Çamlıhemşin y de Hemşin.

Hopa Hemşin (grupo del este) toma su nombre del distrito de Hopa, abundante en ese distrito y alrededor de la ciudad de Kemalpaşa, este grupo conforman a la mayoría de la población. Una comunidad pequeña de este grupo también vive en Kazajistán, donde se exiliaron de Georgia durante la era stalinista.

Existen diferencias importantes en ambos grupos. La diferencia principal es lingüística; el grupo occidental habla un dialecto propio de las lenguas túrquicas, en cambio, el del este habla un dialecto antiguo del armenio conocida como Homshetsi ("la lengua de Hamshen").
Actualmente existe un renacimiento cultural entre el grupo del este.

Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-

RIGHTLY SO

Editorial RIGHTLY SO by Jean Ipdjian

During the recent debate regarding the infamous Protocols, which were finally somehow signed on Saturday in one of the halls of the University of Zurich in Zurich, Switzerland and under the supervision and watchful eyes of Mrs. Hilary Clinton fulfilling the role of the almighty overseer, an important point was raised by a number of people as to whether diasporan Armenians had the right to “interfere” in the affairs of the Republic of Armenia, as they are not nationals of that State. Technically, the president of Armenia and the members of the parliament in that country are only responsible to the people of their country who have lawfully or otherwise elected them to their office. The issue here of course is not the manner in which they were elected nor is it whether the elections are fair or any other such considerations. Armenia is one of the countries in the world where there are more ethnic Armenians living outside Armenia, generally referred to as the Diaspora, than there are in Armenia itself. And in difference to other such cases in the world, diasporan Armenians whatever their nationality and wherever they happen to live, have very close spiritual links to that, to their mother country, Armenia. Even during Soviet times this bond, this spiritual and moral bond was considered to be so important that it was carefully nurtured to grow and prosper. The Soviets had even created a special department whose job was the management and administration of this bond. In the last years of the Soviet Union, when Armenia was hit by a devastating earthquake which destroyed hundreds of villages, tens of towns, most of the city of then Leninakan, which had left hundreds of thousands of people homeless, the then authorities had amply harvested the result of their efforts by the unprecedented drive of aid that poured into the country from Armenian communities all over the world and from countries who knew of Armenia and its plight mainly because of their Armenian communities. Later on, during the war of independence of the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabagh - Artsakh in Armenian - the same kind of assistance was readily available from the Diaspora and happily accepted.Until the last very few months there was not a speech uttered by ant official whether from the Armenian government, or from organisations based in Armenian nor from the Diaspora where the need to further strengthen Armenia-Diaspora ties were not stressed. And rightly so. Rightly so, because the absolute majority of Armenians both in Armenia and the Diaspora had the illusion that their fate and long-term wellbeing hinged on that bond and relationship, since one of the most important characteristics of the majority of Armenians is the preservation of their national identity, the perseverance of their ethnicity as long as possible with the utopian aim of one day seeing the rest of their motherland freed and returned to them where they would eventually end up living. Today this ideal seems utopian. Earlier I used that word consciously, because if a mere twenty years ago someone had suggested that today we were going to debate whether the independent Republic of Armenia should sign a treaty or not, he would have been considered a hopeless dreamer. Rightly so, because a century ago our nation was subjected to the horrors of the Genocide, whose international recognition as Genocide was actively sought for by Armenian organisations in the Diaspora and till the last change of government in Armenia was one of the main objects of her foreign policy. Therefore, the question whether diasporan Armenians have the right to interfere in whether such a momentous agreement is entered into or not goes beyond technicalities. The signing of the Protocols as they stand today do not concern only the Republic of Armenia and her inhabitants, but it concerns the whole of the Armenian nation in its entirety regardless of nationality and residence. Armenians in Diaspora have that right, because they are the result of the occupation of their homeland by Turkey, because they are the result of the persecution and Genocide committed by that country and because Armenia is part of their homeland. And rightly so. London - 2009

Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-

EDITORIAL DE ARMENIAREBELDE

jueves 15 de octubre de 2009

COMPATRIOTAS; LLEGO EL MOMENTO DE PONER BLANCO SOBRE NEGRO, LA MAYORIA DE LOS SITIOS ( POR NO DECIR TODOS ), QUE MUESTRAN OCUPARSE, PREOCUPARSE Y SACRIFICARSE POR LA CUESTION Y LA CAUSA ARMENIA, SON SECTORIZADOS Y DISCRETAMENTE REGULATORIOS DE LOS COMENTARIOS Y LAS OPINIONES QUE NO SEAN AFINES A SUS CONSIGNAS;
" NINGUNO CANALIZA ACCIONES CONCRETAS, MASIVAS Y CONTINUAS CORRECTAMENTE ORGANIZADAS Y DIRIGIDAS "; LAS PROTESTAS EMITIDAS EN CUALQUIERA DE ESTOS SITIOS " SON TOTALMENTE INCONDUCENTES " AUNQUE NOS DIGAN Y PENSEMOS LO CONTRARIO.- LAS ACCIONES REALES Y CONCRETAS DEBEMOS REALIZARLAS Y FIRMARLAS PERSONALMENTE EN LOS SITIOS CORRESPONDIENTES.- Debemos ocuparnos, empeñarnos y comprometernos en buscar los sitios oficiales donde realizar las acciones directas y concretas ( seguros de que llegan ), utilizando las herramientas de Google y Yahoo; Alli encontramos todo lo necesarios para emitir nuestras inquietudes y sugerencias, recibiendo sus respuestas en nuestros Email ( que en esos sitios nos ocultan, niegan o nunca llegan ).- Saludos; Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.- http://www.president.am/ http://www.whitehouse.gov/ etc. etc.-

Opinion de Ian por Aram Barseghian

14 / 10 / 2009.- Estimado Sr. Administrador de Ian Dn. Aram Barseghian; Su capitulacion respecto a este hecho es cierta y conocida y se esperaba que tarde o temprano sucederia a partir de la segunda Independencia; Lo que nadie dijo ni dice ni dira desde la Diaspora es,: " en un marco de actualidad " ¿¿¿ cual es el modelo politico, geopolitico y economico pretendido por nosotros que deberia seguir la Rca de Armenia ???.- Todo lo demas que rodee al realismo de su opinion, es lirismo y sentimentalismo que deberemos plasmar en Centros de Residentes de Familiares Diasporicos de Descendientes de Armenios Emigrados por el Genocidio Perpetrado por los Turcos Otomanos en 1915 / 1923; Y que deberemos recordar los 24 de Abril y 18 de Mayo, transmitiendo esto al mundo y a quienes nos sucedan.- Gracias.- Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-

13 de OCTUBRE 2009Un cambio geopolítico en el Cáucaso y en nuestra Diáspora
Fuente Nota de Opinión, Editorial de IAN.
Escribe Aram Barceghian
Un fuerte golpe a nuestra Identidad

Comencemos por casa.
Nadie puede negar que los Protocolos nos inflingen un verdadero golpe a la identidad de los armenios diasporeanos.La enorme Diáspora post genocidio cuyo mito convocante ha sido desde siempre, la lucha por la justicia, el reconocimiento del Genocidio de 1915 y la devolución de los territorios armenios usurpados por Turquía, sufre una crisis de dimensiones inciertas con la firma de los protocolos.¿Es posible que los protocolos tengan entre otros objetivos golpear en el corazón mismo de la Diáspora armenia?Hemos visto lo sucedido estos días de revuelo y agitación. Hay unos pocos pero representativos dirigentes comunitarios a nivel mundial y personalidades que apoyaron públicamente la firma de los protocolos.Y están los otros, bastantes más, los que salieron a combatir los protocolos, reclamándole al Presidente de Armenia en su reciente gira por las comunidades armenias el mundo, que no acepte las precondiciones turcas, acusando de traidores a los primeros.Hay quienes se lamentan por que ven en estos protocolos el tiro de gracia a la Cuestión Armenia. Si Armenia reconoce las actuales fronteras con Turquía, renuncia a la Armenia occidental en manos turcas, dicen. Y si además se crea una comisión de estudio para “analizar imparcialmente” lo sucedido en 1915, habremos retrocedido 50 años de lucha ya que un hecho aceptado internacionalmente como “Genocidio Armenio”, es puesto en duda por los mismos armenios! Algo impensable para la mayoría de nosotros, hace solo unos meses atrás.Algunos opinan que si la Diáspora pierde su mito convocante o sea su causa, pierde su identidad y su fuerza comenzará a enflaquecer. Una Diáspora mas debil, ¿significará una Armenia mas debil?.¿Es posible que los protocolos tengan también por objetivo crear una cuña entre Armenia y su Diáspora?.Hemos visto en estos días que hay voces que hablan de la “traición” del Presidente de Armenia, y de que la Diáspora debiera retirarle su apoyo al país de los armenios.Y ¿A quien le sirve este sombrío escenario?De algo no quedan dudas, a los descendientes de armenios nos están quitando las vías por las que circulamos durante mas de 9 décadas.¿Armenia vuelve a estar bajo el dominio turco?El presidente Sarkisian dijo el día de la firma en un discurso público, que “Armenia no tiene otra alternativa” que firmar estos protocolos.Si uno observa el video de la reunión del Comité de Seguridad de Armenia, que decide por unanimidad avanzar con los protocolos, - en donde entre otros se encontraba nuestro Katolicós Karekin II- puede darse una idea de lo que está pasando con la dirigencia armenia al ver sus rostros de preocupación y sus gestos de nerviosismo. A mi personalmente me agustió ver esto.Creo que la dirigencia armenia ve enormes riesgos en este proceso, pero no tiene mas remedio que seguirlo. Particularmente no tengo dudas que estos protocolos les fueron impuestos a Armenia sin más, mas allá de la posible inoperancia (denunciada por algunas fuerzas opositoras) del Ministerio de Rel.Exteriores armenio. Escuchar al ex Ministro de Rel. Exteriores Vartán Oskanian, confirman esta idea.La dirigencia de la República (será para salvar su imagen acaso) afirma que Armenia ha comenzado con este proceso y que necesita abrir sus fronteras para “comerciar” mas eficientemente… Y deja entrever que los turcos no son los de antes, han cambiado, vivimos otros tiempos… Argumento que es apoyado por algunos grupos.Y ¿Cuáles son los riesgos de esta “apertura comercial”?Enormes:1) Que la infinitamente mas grande economía turca se apodere de los mercados, las empresas y comercios de Armenia, 2) que los pequeños productores armenios quiebren por falta de escala productiva, 3) que los capitales turcos “compren” las tierras armenias, los edificios emblemáticos... etc.Si esto sucede, Armenia habrá perdido su independencia política y diplomática.Recordemos que los intereses del Estado turco y los intereses de los armenios son contrapuestos. Mientras Turquía no reconozca el Genocidio, fue es y será una amenaza constante para Armenia.¿Es posible que los protocolos tengan por objeto poner nuevamente bajo el dominio turco a la nación armenia?La Guerra de Georgia, las rutas energéticas, Rusia, Turquía y la Cuestión de Nagorno KarabajLo que no se dice siempre es la verdad.Las energía mueve al mundo. Especialmente a las grandes potencias.De momento, el oleoducto BTC (Azerbaiján, Georgia y Turquía) es la pieza más importante de una serie de proyectos energéticos (petróleo y gas) que han de pasar por el cáucaso. Esta energía es importante para Europa e incluso Israel.Hasta la guerra Ruso-Georgiana de 2008 por Osetia del Sur y Abjasia, Georgia era considerada una pieza clave en esta ruta, eludiendo a Armenia, aliada de Rusia .Rusia era la principal contrincante del proyecto BTC, ya que cuenta con su propio oleoducto y gasoducto que llega a Europa directamente.Luego de la guerra, Georgia ha quedado en evidencia como un país que es un compendio de problemas más que de soluciones: inestabilidad política, guerra civil y separatismos. Y eso no es lo que busca el negocio de la energía.La hábil diplomacia turca convierte a Rusia en socia y deja a los EEUU fuera del cáucaso. Turquía y Rusia consideran el cáucaso como sus zonas de influencia y logran cooperar en los proyectos de energía.Por eso los armenios sienten “que Rusia les soltó la mano”. En realidad una vez mas, queda demostrada en la historia que los acuerdos ruso-turcos tienen un costo alto para los armenios. Turquía ha impuesto todas sus precondiciones a los armenios y Rusia las ha apoyado.Nagorno-KarabajNo quedan dudas que la Cuestión de Karabaj debe llegar a un acuerdo para poder materializarse este plan.Aquí existe el otro riesgo para la nación armenia. Mucha presión en varios frentes a la vez podría hacer que los armenios deban ceder una vez más en sus derechos inalienables, esta vez en Karabaj.Karabaj es lo último que Armenia puede ceder, no podemos hacer conseciones en Artsaj.¿ Es posible que la dirigencia Armenia haya entregado la Causa Armenia respecto a Turquía como moneda de cambio para poder negociar mejor en Karabaj?.¿Por que Armenia?Armenia es un país estable para pasar los oleoductos y gasoductos, y los caminos y trenes, además Rusia la considera como su propio dominio... La gran duda es que le va a quedar al pueblo armenio de todo esto? El riesgo es que se quede sin nada y los únicos beneficiarios sean las mafias y grupos de poder que actúan allí.Turquía da en varios blancos con estos protocolos:Golpea a la Diáspora armeniaIntenta subyugar a la Rep. De ArmeniaAsocia a Rusia, en las rutas de la energía y se afianza dejando fuera a los EEUUCumple con Europa abriendo las fronteras con ArmeniaSe muestra como un país amante de la paz y la concordanciaDisciplina a los kurdos de su país, al amenazar con quitarles sus tierras y devolvérselas a sus antiguos dueños (los nuevos socios) la nación armeniaComo dijera el Presidente de Azerbaiján, Aliev en estos días:El proceso de los protocolos ha llevado a encolerizar a la Diáspora armenia, crear una fuerte resistencia en la opinión pública de Armenia, rechazos de los nacionalistas turcos por acordar con Armenia antes de que Kartabaj sea acordado entre las partes y rechazo de Azerbaiján por lo mismo.El apuro por cerrar todos los conflictos a la vez para abrir las rutas de la energía, podría llevar a mayores conflictos en la región.La Diáspora armenia y la oposición en Armenia todavía tienen la esperanza que el parlamento armenio "corrija" las concesiones unilaterales hechas a Turquía.Nosotros los descendientes de armenios reclamaremos desde los países de habla hispana por que tenemos el derecho de hacerlo y utilizaremos ese derecho.La historia se está escribiendo ahora.
Aram BarceghianCreador de IAN

PROTOCOLO

Davidian: Turkish-Armenian Protocols: Reality and Irrationality
By David Davidian • on October 1, 2009 •

“The Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey” officially announced in Berne, Yerevan, and Ankara on Aug. 31, has been brought to center stage and not without controversy. In order to fully appreciate and rationally analyze this yet-to-be-ratified document that is meant to serve as the basis for further dialogue between the parties, its origins and accepted norms of international behavior regarding it must be understood. The document exists, it is not going away, and undoubtedly will be ratified by the Armenian Parliament in short order. The Turkish Parliament may delay ratification. While this article cannot cover every aspect in depth, the attempt is to provide a foundation to understand what may or may not be transpiring between Armenia and Turkey and why.
This protocol is the culmination of at least five years of discussions between Armenians and Turks at different official levels. Beginning circa 2003, talks were underway between then Turkish and Armenian Foreign Ministers Abdullah Gul and Vartan Oskanian, respectively. While these talks appeared to be non-productive, in 2005, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan suggested instituting a joint historical commission to study what was termed “claims of genocide.” Armenia and Turkey are talking for many reasons; if for no other reason they are neighbors, irrespective of the outstanding historical issues. Why might Armenia deign talking with Turkey? Without talking, nothing can be addressed between the two parties, including issues not related to the protocol, and these are the parties that are the internationally recognized as players, in spite of an extensive Armenian Diaspora.
Neither Armenia nor Turkey is in a position to unilaterally act completely independent of the interests of larger regional or international states. Subordinate states have to constantly re-examine their interests in order to adjust with those of major powers with the aim of maximizing bargaining stand while understanding (and attempting not to capitulate to) the interest of the other parties. In general, this precludes these states from engaging in zero sum inanity, such as demanding an all-or-nothing state of affairs.
If the combined political pressure from Russia, U.S., and EU “strongly suggests” not only Armenia consider discussing with the Turks lifting their border blockade but attempt to discuss historical issues, it is not acceptable or even in Armenia’s interest to simply say “no.” In a crude analogy, Serbia’s Milosevic responded with the refrain “no, no, no” in response to the demands of major powers to end the campaign of ethnic cleansing regardless of the claim “we didn’t start it.” His country was bombed and its infrastructure heavily damaged.
Equivalent pressure was put on the Turkey to begin serious talks with Armenia in spite of Turkish demands that Armenian forces leave Nagorno-Karabagh and its environs, and that Armenia end support for genocide recognition before discussions can become substantive.1 Interestingly enough, neither of these Turkish demands is stated in the protocol.
Interplay of competing and converging interests
There appears to be a confluence of outcome in advancing Armenian-Turkish relations despite major interests appearing orthogonal to each other. The EU requires no border conflicts among any of its members or those in ascension towards membership, such as Turkey. It also has trade pacts and bilateral agreements with Turkey required by EU’s ascension criteria. The Turkish blockade of the Armenian border makes a mockery of many of their tenets. Moreover, the EU would like to see a stable Caucasus to facilitate energy transport to Europe, as parts of Europe froze last winter when Russia was forced to shut gas through Ukrainian transport pipelines. Any stable routing is in EU’s interest. Moreover, without an open border, Armenia cannot actively engage in the European Neighborhood Policy which is an extension of the European Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Armenia. As of 2006,2 the resulting Action Plan for Armenia has provided over 2 billion euros in community assistance. The EU would like to see the fruits of their assistance grow through expanded trade. While it is unclear if Armenia would be part of any future or expanded energy transit routes, Turkey does want to expand its role and Armenia provides a convenient and alternative pathway. In the process, Georgia’s role as a forced transit route around Armenia may diminish. This would be in Russia’s interest.
The full extent of Russian interests in advancing this protocol itself could be the subject of a small book. However, it is clear that Russian economic interests in Armenia, which are considerable, amounting to nearly $2.5 billion,3 can generate better returns with at least a semi-open border and established relations between Armenia and Turkey. Russia’s ability to bring Armenia to its knees in short order is astounding. It could force the closure of the Armenian nuclear power plant at Medzamor, for “technical reasons,” eliminating about 40 percent of Armenia’s electrical generating capacity. Russian gas, running through Georgian pipelines to Armenia could easily be “damaged” during winter months, cutting off gas and crippling Armenia. This combined with the ability to enact restrictions on remittances from Russian Armenians; it is clear Russia holds the keys in Armenia. Whether Armenia should have sold off critical infrastructure to the Russians is now a moot point.
Russia watched Azerbaijan react in disbelief when Turkish President Abdullah Gul traveled to Armenia for a soccer match a year ago. It appeared to Azerbaijan that Turkey had forsaken it with Gul stepping foot in Armenia. Turkey has been the champion in support of Azerbaijan in the frozen conflict over the Armenian populated enclave Nagorno-Karabagh. Karabagh had been placed under Azerbaijani jurisdiction during the Soviet era. Now it is basically an extension of Armenia after Azerbaijan lost control of it in a war. Over the past year, Azerbaijan made threats to stop gas shipments to Turkey and the use of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and began auditing institutions in Azerbaijan funded with Turkish money. Turkey maintained, until the protocol was made public, that it would not enter into border discussions until Armenian troops vacated Nagorno-Karabagh. There could not have been a more efficient way to create suspicion of Turkish intentions towards Azerbaijan, bringing Baku to a point where it could decide to transport a larger percentage of its gas via existing Russian pipelines. The Azerbaijanis may not like dealing with the Russians, but at least the latter is predictable.
Georgia’s war with Russia changed the balance of power in the Caucasus and in doing so became a catalyst in advancing Armenian-Turkish talks and accelerating, by perhaps a year or so, the establishment of the protocols. Georgia became one of the two front-line states, along with Ukraine, that became a battleground for influence between the U.S. and Russia. The United States can project power, but little can replace the influence on Georgia and Ukraine of a neighboring power. In the end, Georgia became a weaker state after the August 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, not just because it effectively lost South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and is under partial blockade, but Russia made a clear statement about its continued influence in the Southern Caucasus. Azerbaijan was subsequently forced to re-think entertaining notions of attacking Nagorno-Karabagh. In the zeal to create rough parity with the increased Russian influence moving south across the Caucasus, Turkey was forced to engage Armenia by: accelerating diplomatic efforts, Gul attending the soccer match in Armenia, and advancing a now-defunct Caucasian Initiative, all at the expense of Azerbaijan. This exposed a flaw in Turkish foreign policy by damaging relations with Azerbaijan. In addition, Turkey has shown interest in actually buying Caspian Basin gas and reselling to the EU, cutting into Azerbaijani profits. Individual state interest trumps so-called brotherly relations.
The August 2008 Russian-Georgian war terminated Russia’s use of Georgian transport routes to maintain activities at Russian military bases in Armenia. Reports and quick Turkish denials claim the Russians began working with Turkey to allow the use of their airspace to maintain operations in Armenia.4,5 Also, supply trains destined for Armenia initially remained stalled in Georgia, creating enough worry that Georgian routes to the Black Sea or to the north Caucasus are simply not reliable for Armenian trade.
A closed Armenian border with Turkey would make any land transport of Russian military items difficult—an open border would facilitate this. Why might Turkey allow Russia to transport military equipment to its base in Gyumri? For Turkey, the prospect of an arrangement, especially on its terms, outweighed any potential threats from Russian bases especially in light of greatly increased bilateral trade and cooperation in potential energy transport to the EU. Besides, once in operation, Turkey can always attempt to extract concessions from Russia for the use of transport routes and can restrict passage any time.
Russia and Turkey cannot project complimentary influence in the larger region without a resolution of the Turkish blockade of the Armenian border. The $500 million Russian loan to Armenia6 earlier this year reinforces the strategic importance Russia places on Armenia and with clear ability to influence policies in Yerevan.
There is talk of Turkey warming up to the estranged Georgian region of Abkhazia, which advances Russian interest at the expense of Georgian-Turkish relations. In the words of a think tank associated with the Turkish FM, “Ankara could no longer ignore the new reality in the region.”7 Armenian news outlets have quoted Cenk Baslamis writing in the Turkish daily Milliyet, “Ankara will recognize independence of Abkhazia in the near future, while Moscow will recognize Turkish part of Cyprus.” Apparently, this topic began surfacing with an article by Paul Goble in the English Language Georgian Daily.8 While this could hardly happen overnight, the trial balloon has been released. Ultimately, Turkey can simultaneously give tacit approval of the “new reality” while fomenting anti-Russian agitation in Abkhazia. Turkish-Russian political relationships have been quite dynamic since talks began circa 1996 to reduce Turkish involvement in Russia’s Chechen war and Russian support for the PKK.9 The Turkish-Russian relationship culminated with the historic visit of Russian President Putin to Turkey in late 2004.10
One can see a confluence of Russian and Turkish interest on one side and U.S. pressure on the Turks to “unfreeze” discussions with Armenians and reach some interim agreement—the protocol.11
The U.S. has transitioned its policy objectives in the southern Caucasus from those of the previous decade. In the last decade, the U.S. aimed to secure the development of latent energy reserves and the ability to securely move them westward. Much of this effort was centered upon Azerbaijani oil and gas reserves and those on the eastern shores of the Caspian, such as Turkmen gas and Kazakh oil. This effort required the exaggeration of existing Azerbaijani reserves and tolerating a series of despotic regimes in Baku. The U.S. State Department claimed that from 50-200 billion barrels of oil existed under Azerbaijani sovereignty. It turned out to be from 5-20 billion barrels. In fact, Azerbaijan will become net importer of oil by about 2021, with peak output declining circa 2012, unless substantial new fields are discovered.12 Claims such as “The Deal of a Century” were touted in the western presses, especially in the U.S. and the UK. Clearly, the regional competitor capable of transporting Caspian Basin energy resources was Russia. As the decade proceeded various projects were proposed. The largest was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project signed in 1994. This pipeline avoided Armenia and Iran, even though it was more expensive to construct the line through Georgia. Being Russia’s strategic partner in the region, Armenia was bypassed for political reasons. Iran was not even considered, since Azerbaijan is a major source of oil for Israel. U.S. energy related companies have substantial percentage interest in nearly every transport consortium and gas or oil fields in Azerbaijan.
The latest gas pipeline proposed is the Nabbuco pipeline supplying Azerbaijani and Turkmen gas through Turkey, to the Balkans and into central Europe. Other projects include BlueStream bringing Russian gas into Turkey via a pipeline under the Black Sea.
As western energy development and transport schemes became viable alternatives to the Russian pipelines and with Russia architecting and successfully negotiating with energy partners, by early to mid this decade, U.S. policy in the region moved from competition with Russia to mild cooperation. Peace and stability were in both U.S. and Russian interest. As energy transportation requires deposits and contiguous geography respectively, U.S. (and European) efforts became focused first on freezing armed hostilities, then onto solving existing ethnic disputes. The closed Turkish-Armenian frontier must have been at the top of that list, considering the zeal at which Turkey accepted the soccer match invitation at the jaw dropping chagrin of Baku.
U.S. officials have stated that an open border with Turkey would reduce Armenia’s dependence on both Russia and Iran. However, any reduction in Russian influence on Armenia with an open Turkish border is questionable since Russia owns major segments of Armenian’s strategic infrastructure, such as the electrical grid, the operation of Armenia’s nuclear power station, the rail system, and has interest in the Armenian-Iranian gas pipeline, among other things.
If steady energy transport and revenues generated are at the basis for current U.S. policy, it may not be surprising that a change in the political status quo of Nagorno-Karabagh may now be in the interest of major powers. Until now the status quo with respect to Nagorno-Karabagh was in the interest of major players except for those in Baku (the daily bellicose vocabulary of Baku would have one expecting an Azerbaijani attack on Nagorno-Karabagh any day for the past several years). This frozen status was used by Moscow to influence policy in Azerbaijan. The “new regional realities” and political transformations have taken place with the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabagh conducting their own affairs outside of Azerbaijani sovereignty. The existence of Nagorno-Karabagh in any form does not affect the transport of energy, for there would be no logical reason to run any pipelines over its mountains when that region is surrounded by relatively flat lands. In addition, Nagorno-Karabagh does not have any hydrocarbon deposits. A real resolution to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict may be possible in the near future in light of these “new regional realities.”
With an open or semi-open Turkish-Armenian border, Georgia will quickly lose much of its overland transport fees from Armenian wholesale importers. Reduced importance of Georgia on Armenia also serves Russian interests. Russia would prefer to see Georgia in its sphere of influence. Until that time, Russia would like Georgia simply wither on the vine.
The protocol
Other than state institutions and the negotiators themselves, no one knows under what conditions, stated or perceived interests, principles, etc., the protocol discussions proceeded. The process was not at all transparent. It is clear that a unique confluence of political resolve exhibited between the U.S. and Russia across the Atlantic and between Turkey and Russia regionally, had a strong influence on both parties to reach a framework for further negotiations. It is not accurate to assume that Turkey, Armenia or both could simply ignore these international pressures.
Before the protocol was made public, Turkey maintained two basic preconditions that had to be addressed before formal negotiations could proceed: Armenia end its support for expanding international recognition of the Turkish genocide of the Armenians, and Armenian forces withdraw from Nagorno-Karabagh and surrounding regions. In addition to these two basic preconditions, references were made regarding Armenia specifically stating it has no claims on any lands in eastern Anatolia and by default recognizing current borders as inviolable. None of these items are mentioned in the protocol. There are only three actionable items in the protocol, the rest is procedural.13 These are:
1. Agree to open the common border within 2 months after the entry into force of this protocol,
2. Agree to conduct regular political consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries;
implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations;
make the best possible use of existing transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks between the two countries, and to undertake measures in this regard;
develop the bilateral legal framework in order to foster cooperation between the two countries;
cooperate in the fields of science and education by encouraging relations between the appropriate institutions as well as promoting the exchange of specialists and students, and act with the aim of preserving the cultural heritage of both sides and launching common cultural projects;
establish consular cooperation in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 in order to provide necessary assistance and protection to the citizens of the two countries;
take concrete measures in order to develop trade, tourism and economic cooperation between the two countries;
engage in a dialogue and reinforce their cooperation on environmental issues.
3. Agree on the establishment of an intergovernmental bilateral commission which shall comprise separate sub-commissions for the prompt implementation of the commitments mentioned in operational paragraph 2 above in this protocol. To prepare the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commissions, a working group headed by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be created two months after the day following the entry into force of this protocol. Within three months after the entry into force of this protocol, these modalities shall be approved at ministerial level. The intergovernmental commission shall meet for the first time immediately after the adoption of the said modalities. The sub-commissions shall start their work at the latest one month thereafter and they shall work continuously until the completion of their mandates. The timetable and elements agreed by both sides for the implementation of this protocol are mentioned in the annexed document, which is integral part of this protocol.
Both Turkey and Armenia must ratify the text before this protocol becomes actionable.
Item 1 is the clause that serves as the basis for opening the border. However, how open it would be and restrictions of its use by the parties, is not stated.
Item 2 refers to the furtherance of bilateral relations, but in particular notes a bilateral commission to be established to examine the “historical” record. While not explicitly stated, the overarching historical issue is the genocide of the Armenians. It is generally understood this is the paramount issue that will be examined.
Item 3 is a procedural item referring to implementing Item 2.
Since Armenia has long stated its desire to enter into discussions with Turkey without any preconditions to affect a resolution of Item 1—lifting the Turkish border blockade—it can be assumed that Item 2 was a Turkish initiative. It is also assumed that Turkey was never strategically or fundamentally against opening the border, judging by its current tactical interests.
Thus, we can tabulate the preconditions that were suggested, agreed to or dismissed throughout discussions, post 2005, especially after the election of Armenian President Serge Sarkisian in 2008.
Condition
Suggesting Party
In Protocol
Open border
Both
Yes
Armenian forces withdraw from Nagorno-Karabagh
Turkey
No
Historical commission
Turkey
Yes
End international recognition of Armenian Genocide
Turkey
No
Explicitly state no land claims on Western Armenia
Turkey
No
Roughly speaking, the outcome of the agreement is the promise of an open border in exchange for the establishment of the historic commission.
The “winning” and “losing” party has been spun by both sides. Typical of Turkish spin is read in the pro-government daily Hurriyet, Sept. 15, 2009, in an article written by Yusuf Kanli14 where he states:
“First of all Armenia has accepted for the first time ever the creation of a history commission that might feature historians from interested third parties in examining the genocide claims. That is, without saying so the Serge Sarkisian administration of Armenian has conceded from the ‘Genocide is a fact, there is no need to verify it through scientific research or to discuss it’ position.”
What appears to be an Armenian concession to the Turks is at best a method for Turks to delay international debate on genocide recognition. It is unclear why the Turkish side sees this as a victory unless delaying recognition was their original goal. Using such a commission as a delay tactic will ultimately result in a strategic blunder as Turkish disingenuousness will be clear to the international community. Whether the Turkish end game is gaining a few years of leeway or denying consent to an unfavorable commission outcome, or both, can have negative repercussions with EU countries, highlighting Turkish resistance to reforms expected of it. This may be the case with European states that have recognized the genocide, such as Switzerland. Switzerland is a party to this protocol process.
Turkey may have made another mistake in misreading Armenian opposition to a historical commission since Erdogan suggested it in 2005. Armenian opposition to an historical commission, mainly seen in the diaspora, is based on the assumption that any inquiry into the historical record regarding the genocide is tantamount to questioning the veracity of the genocide. Over 20 countries have recognized the Turkish genocide of the Armenians as an indisputable fact and the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) have stated without reservation that the Armenians were subject to genocide. Scores of renown historians agree it was genocide and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), commission by the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC), in their study concluded the Armenians were subject to genocide.15 What other possible outcome could such an honest historical commission as stated in Item 2, be other than a reiteration of what is an accepted fact. Unlike the Jews in the aftermath of the Nuremberg Trials, Armenians do not have the luxury of completely rejecting any inquiries into confirming the genocide. The Jews have the ability to reject as blasphemous, for example, somebody publishing an analysis of the gas used in gas chambers as being not really Zyklon-B, but perhaps Zyklon-C, or -D.
Recent Armenian protests16 and proclamations against this commission certainly give the Turks reason to assume they extracted some sort of a concession from the Armenians. Protests since 2005 against any historical commission may have unwittingly helped Armenia’s negotiators.
Paraphrasing Turkish professor Taner Akcam,17 what previously unknown document could possibly exist that will allow one to negate the genocide of the Armenians in light of all the research that has been done and the clear recognition it has received?
It is entirely possible that Armenian historians would be so inept so as to allow Turkish denialists to re-write history. The chance of this happening with the entire concerned world watching is doubtful. Moreover, if the commission becomes a mockery of the facts, any conclusions it makes would be considered effectively null and void. Besides, chances are high that many of the commission sessions will be hosted in Switzerland, which not only has recognized the crime of genocide committed against the Armenians, but should arrest any deniers on their territory. However, even if the outcome of the historical commission’s “research” reiterates the fact of genocide, subsequent redress may remain unresolved.
Yusuf Kanli continues:
“Secondly, for the first time ever in the post-Soviet era, Armenia has agreed to recognize the joint border with Turkey as was defined in the Kars Treaty, though there is no reference in the protocols to the Kars Treaty. Such recognition by Armenia is no less than declaring it has no territorial claims from Turkey or it has turned a cold shoulder to diaspora’s land claims from Turkey.”
There is a border that exists between Armenia and Turkey. On one side are Turkish guards, on the other Russian and Armenian ones. Recognizing the current border is required in order to open it. Hurriyet and its editors engage in extreme spin when they claim that border recognition requires recognizing the process that created that demarcation. No where in the protocol does it mention the Treaty of Kars, the Treaty of Moscow, or the Treaty of Alexandropol for that matter. This is because there is no international obligation for Armenia to recognize such previous treaties in this case. This is well defined in Villiger’s Customary International Law and Treaties18 and in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties19, ratified by Armenia20 in May 2005. The latter clearly states in Section 2:
APPLICATION OF TREATIES
Article 28: Non-retroactivity of treaties
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.
Article 29: Territorial scope of treaties
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory.
Article 30: Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter
1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the latter treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one:
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations.
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any question of the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or to any question of responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under another treaty.
At the time of this writing Turkey still has not ratified this convention.21 Armenia has and is under no obligation to recognize the Treaty of Kars or Moscow that basically resulted in the current Turkish-Armenian border. The United States ratified this convention on April 24, 1970.
Positions
Armenia is in an interesting diplomatic position at the publication of this protocol. The only item that changes anything is the physical lifting of the Turkish border blockade. Armenia should ratify this protocol without delay and put pressure on Turkey not to delay or will pay the PR consequences.
Turkey is in a situation where it has alienated its ally Azerbaijan by appearing to cut a deal with Armenia and has been making deals with Russia. It may also be under the false impression it has extracted concessions from Armenia. Turkey cannot appear overtly pan-Turkic in rhetoric in its support of Azerbaijan, as it will be used by opponents of Turkey’s EU ascension. Turkey may try to drag out the mandate of an historical commission but that has its time limits as well. Armenian diplomacy can consistently point to Turkish delay tactics.
Turkey also has an issue with ratification. Some opposition parties object to opening of the border without a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. Turkey might use this as an excuse to re-work the protocol, but that would come at a loss to Turkish diplomacy. Armenia can use this period to press Turkey publicly with actual preconditions if Turkish non-ratification is being used as a technique to gain concessions from Armenia. If Turkey does indeed ratify the protocol, the pro-Islamic AK party will be on the carpet to deliver the goods for Turkey. They have to end alienating Azerbaijan, not appearing too overtly helpful to Armenia while trying to convince the EU it is sincere in solving its ascension demands, and work with its new energy partner, Russia. If Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu, Prime Minster Erdogan, and President Gul fail to convince the Turkish public and the military that engaging Armenia using the guidelines agreed to in the protocols, there may indeed be early elections in Turkey before 2012. The AK party could be swept from power, leaving the protocol in the hands of nationalists which could face public pressure to declare it null and void.
Turkey will be in a diplomatic disadvantage if Armenia makes no errors.
Trade issues
There appears to be no official public study commissioned by the government of Armenia having as its basis a political and economic analysis demonstrating that opening the border between Armenia and Turkey will benefit anybody. Armenia may actually have an argument and not even know it. What has been stated publicly are simply guesses, usually positive, by members of the Armenian Parliament, Turkologists, “experts,” or oligarchs. An open border isn’t binary as almost all simple guesses have been based on. An “open border” may simply mean it is not totally closed and only allow products and material to traverse a limited number of hours or days a week or may mean automobile and bus traffic allowed on a weekly basis. There may never be a completely open border. It could also be completely open. This is an unknown at this time, but its answer lies at the center of the affects of an open Turkish-Armenian border on the Armenian economy.
This missing study must include a competitive analysis of all major Armenian industries covering at a minimum: management team expertise, product sales & marketing, product planning, market channels and development, government relations, cross-border transportation, international business planning, credit and banking reviews, and yes, accounting practices. One must then compare these industries with their Turkish counterparts and using Armenian and Turkish demographic buying patterns, determine the viability probability of each Armenian industry assuming free and open competition with the added affects of partial and severe protectionism. Past, current, and projected trading patterns must be evaluated. In parallel, a comparative study must be done with the only other country having a similar geo-political and economic position and that is Georgia. Such a study must determine why Georgia’s GDP is down nearly 40 percent from a year ago considering it has free and open trade with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and has many Black Sea ports.
Solid conclusions cannot be made without studies. If the studies are skewed (such as not taking into account: general corruption, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, racketeering, graft, extortion, cartels, blackmail, potential EC-centric liability and product quality issues, engagement and exit strategies adjusting for changes in the Turkish government policies, Georgian and Iranian reaction, changes in employment patterns and the consequences of any subsequent brain drain, etc.) there is every chance of a failed evaluation. Perhaps the reason none of these studies seem to exist is because they would expose too much of Armenia’s black economy.
If history is any guide, Armenian oligarchs and those aspiring to be, may simply attempt to sell assets to Turks. An easy way to personal wealth is to replace the “headache” of producing domestic products with those made in Turkey, considering local distribution channels exist and are near monopolies. Armenians emptied out factories in the country in early and mid-nineties and sold their contents, including machines, to the Iranians. Apparently no accounting was made of those transactions.
It will be interesting to note if laws will be enacted to protect indigenous Armenian industries. Unregulated trade, combined with 90 years of Turkish experience in the mechanisms of market economics, could easily destroy Armenia’s economy and return the Armenian people to the specter of Turkish domination.
However, with Russian control of major segments of Armenia’s infrastructure, unfettered Turkish inroads into the Armenian economy will presumably be moderated. In addition, EU analysis will be watching closely over Turkish treatment of its neighbors.
David Davidian is a senior system architect at a major IT corporation engaging in technical intelligence analysis. He manages the U.S. office of RegionalKinetics.com and currently resides in Belmont, Mass.
References
1 Turkish-Armenian relations, football diplomacy, Sept. 3, 2009, http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14380297.
2 Armenia, http://www.newnations.com/Archive/2006/June/am.html.
3 There Are Still Untapped Reserves in Armenian-Russian Friendship, http://www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/print/?nid=36647.
4 Georgian Transit Ban Hinders Russian Military Presence in Armenia, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav101008a.shtml.
5 Ankara Denies Turkey Route for Russian Base in Gumri, http://www.asbarez.com/2009/08/17/ankara-denies-turkey-route-for-russian-base-in-gumri/.
6 Armenia Confirms $500 Million Loan From Russia, http://www.rferl.org/content/Armenia_Confirms_Loan_From_Russia/1380318.html.
7 Turkish-Abkhazia Ties Test Turkey’s Strategic Partnership with Georgia, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=35464&cHash=8a62793752.
8 Might Turkey be the Next Country to Recognize Abkhazia?, Paul Goble, http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14534&Itemid=130.
9 Turkish Volunteers in Chechnya, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=300, Russia accuses Turkish NGOs of continuing aid to Chechen rebels, praises improvements in Saudi approach, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-89675122.html, Russia’s “Kurdish Card” In Turkish-Russian Rivalry, http://members.internettrash.com/pkk/a-russia.html.
10 Improving Turkish-Russian Relations: Turkey’s New Foreign Policy and Its Implications for the United States, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2219.
11 Themes behind Turkey’s surprise move on Armenia, http://www.reporter.am/go/article/2009-09-04-strategy-politics-and-opportunism-.
12 Real Azerbaijan, Khronika Neobyavlennoi Katastrofi (Chronically Unannounced Catastrophe) Jan. 2, 2007, Eldar Namazov.
13 Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey, www.armenianow.com/pdf/20090831_protocol.pdf.
14 The Armenian Opening, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=the-armenian-opening-2009-09-15.
15 The Applicability of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to Events Which Occurred During the Early Twentieth Century–Legal Analysis Prepared for the International Center for Transitional Justice, http://www.ictj.org/images/content/7/5/759.pdf.
16 Aghjayan: In Pursuit of Justice and True Friendship, http://www.hairenik.com/weekly/2009/09/20/aghjayan-in-pursuit-of-justice-and-true-friendship/.
17 Taner Akçam: The decision will be made by politicians, not historians, http://www.reporter.am/go/article/2009-09-15-taner-ak-am-the-decision-will-be-made-by-politicians-not-historians.
18 Customary International Laws and Treaties, Mark Villiger, 1985 ISBN 90-247-2980-7. This is available at: http://books.google.com/books?id=PCoNaFd0TwgC&dq=customary+international+law+on+the+law+of+treaties&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=aboOfjxNy0&sig=6muWHnnFkwNR3-_g-jRUT8K07ow&hl=en&ei=HcixSuz2M5-NtgfV_KDzBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false.
19 http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/viennaconvention.pdf.
20 On July 13, 2006 Armenia recorded a reservation:
Reservation“The Republic of Armenia does not consider itself bound by the provisions of article 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and declares that for any dispute among the Contracting Parties concerning the application or the interpretation of any article of part V of the Convention to be submitted to the International Court of Justice for a decision or to the Conciliation Commission for consideration the consent of all the parties to the dispute is required in each separate case.”
21 Treaty Status of: 21-09-2009 04:03:52 EDT, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en.

Miguel Angel Nalpatian(1942).- Mar del Plata.- Buenos Aires.- Rca Argentina.-